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Case: CV-2013-0000084 Current Judge: John Butler
Robert Terry Johnson, eta I., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Robert Terry Johnson, State Of Idaho, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

2/14/2013

NCPC

CYNTHIA

New Case Filed - 2nd Successive Petition for
Conviction Relief

John Butler

APER

CYNTHIA

Subject: State Of Idaho Appearance Luverne E.
Shull

John Butler

CYNTHIA

Filing: H 10 - Post-conviction act proceedings
John Butler
Paid by: Johnson, Robert Terry (subject) Receipt
number: 0000471 Dated: 2/14/2013 Amount:
$.00 (Cash) For: Johnson, Robert Terry (subject)

PETN

CYNTHIA

Petition and Affidavit for 2nd Successive Post
Conviction Relief

John Butler

MISC

CYNTHIA

Supplement to 2nd Successive PCR - List of
Exhibits in Support of Petition

John Butler

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Motion and Affidavit in Support of Appt of
Counsel

John Butler

3/7/2013

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time

John Butler

3/12/2013

NOTC

CYNTHIA

Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss

John Butler

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Amended Ex-Parte Motion to Extend time for
Response

John Butler

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Extend time

John Butler

MISC

CYNTHIA

Objection to Ex-Parte Motion to Extend Time

John Butler

3/26/2013

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order Granting Extension of Time to Respond

John Butler

3/29/2013

MISC

CYNTHIA

Petitioner's Response to Notice of Intent to
Dismiss

John Butler

4/17/2013

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Ex Parte Motion for Order Clarifying Dates for
State's Response

John Butler

4/18/2013

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order Clarifiying Time for Response

John Butler

4/22/2013

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order re: Appointment of Counsel

John Butler

ORPD

CYNTHIA

Subject: Johnson, Robert Terry Order Appointing John Butler
Public Defender Court appointed Steven R
McRae

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Motion for Extension of Time to Answer

John Butler

AFFD

CYNTHIA

Affidavit of Steven McRae

John Butler

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to
Answer

John Butler

REPL

CYNTHIA

Petitioners Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss
(includes Affidavit of Erik Lehtinen)

John Butler

AFFD

CYNTHIA

Affidavit of Robert Jones

John Butler

AFFD

CYNTHIA

Partial Supp Affidavit of Robert Johnson

John Butler

7/5/2013

SUPP

CYNTHIA

Supplemental Response by the Petitioner

John Butler-

7/31/2013

MEMO

CYNTHIA

Memorandum Decision re Notice of Intent to
Dismiss

John Butler

JDMT

CYNTHIA

Judgment of Dismissal

John Butler

3/13/2013

6/6/2013

7/3/2013

Judge
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Case: CV-2013-0000084 Current Judge: John Butler
Robert Terry Johnson, etal., Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Robert Terry Johnson, State Of Idaho, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

7/31/2013

STAT

CYNTHIA

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

John Butler

CDIS

CYNTHIA

Civil Disposition entered for: Johnson, Robert
Terry, Subject; State Of Idaho, Subject. Filing
date: 7/31/2013

John Butler

8/1/2013

PETN

CYNTHIA

Petition to Declare Petitioner a Vexatious Litigant John Butler

8/8/2013

MISC

CYNTHIA

Objection to Petition to Declare Petitioner a
Vexatious Litigant

John Butler

8/14/2013

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Motion to Reconsider/Request Opportunity to
Respond

John Butler

8/20/2013

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

John Butler

AFFD

CYNTHIA

Affidavit in Support of Motion

John Butler

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Motion to Extend Time to Respond

John Butler

8/26/2013

MISC

CYNTHIA

Objection to the Petitioners Motion for
Appointment of Counsel

John Butler

8/27/2013

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration

John Butler

9/9/2013

APSC

CYNTHIA

Appealed To The Supreme Court

John Butler

STAT

CYNTHIA

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

John Butler

MOTN

CYNTHIA

Motion for Appointment of SAPD

John Butler

ORDR

CYNTHIA

Order Apopinting SAPD on Appeal

John Butler

9/10/2013

Judge

ORIGINAL i;;iSTRiCT COURT
ne~l:l!NG CO. UJAHO
FILED

LUVERNE E. SHULL, Prosecuting Attorney ISBN 5477
Cindy L. Campbell, Chief Deputy, ISBN 3677
2013 APR
Jeremy C. Vaughn, Deputy ISBN 7266
P. 0. Box 86/624 Main Street Gooding, Idaho 83330
Telephone (208) 934-4493 Facsimile (208) 934-4494
goodingprosecutor@gmail.com
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING
ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2013-84

ANSWER

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Luverne E. Shull, Gooding County
Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer Robert Johnson's Second Successive Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief in the above-entitled action as follows:

I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TO ROBERT JOHNSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS
All allegations made by Robert Johnson are denied by the state unless specifically
admitted herein.

IL
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO ROBERT JOHNSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS
1. The State admits that the Petitioner is in custody at the Idaho Correctional Center.
2. The State admits that the name and location of the court which imposed the Petitioner's
judgement/sentence is the Fifth District Court, Gooding, Idaho.
3.

a. The State admits the case number for which sentence was imposed is 4367.

ANSWER-I
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b. The State admits that the Offenses the Petitioner was convicted of were two counts of
first degree murder.
4.

a. The State admits that the date the Petitioner's sentence was imposed was October 2I5\
1994.
b. The State admits the terms of the Petitioner's sentence were two terms of fixed life.

5. The State admits that a finding of guilty was made after pleas to both counts of first degree
murder.
6. The State admits that the Petitioner did not appeal from the judgement of conviction or the
imposition of sentence. The State also acknowledges that by the terms of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement and Acceptance the Petitioner waived his right to appeal the judgement and sentence.
Petitioner alleges:
"#1. Prosecution withheld evidence, a taped confession of Thomas Petersen, that
would have proved that I did not willfully commit any crime and was actually a
victim."
7.

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution withheld evidence, a taped confession of Thomas

Petersen, that would have proved that the Petitioner has not committed a crime and was actually
a victim.

The State denies the allegation.

The confessions of the Petitioner and his co-

defendant, Thomas Robert Petersen were extensively examined in open court at the preliminary
hearing held October 22, 1993. Transcript p.20 and following. The taping of the interviews
containing Thomas Petersen's confessions was disclosed and discussed in the Petitioner's
presence at the preliminary hearing held October 22, 1993. Transcript pp. 89-92.
Discovery responses reveal that complete transcripts of the interviews of both defendants were
provided to both defendants' attorneys November 17, 1993, well before the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement June 24, 1994. See the Acknowledgment of Discovery, dated November 17, 1993,

ANSWER-2
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by Craig D. Hobdey, and State's Response to Discovery, dated November 17, 1993, signed by
Philip A. Brown.
Petitioner's claim that Thomas Robert Petersen harmed him the night of the murders, the
Petitioner's claims that he feared people his co-defendant Thomas Robert Petersen might
influence against him, and Petitioner's wish for witness protection were all out in the open at the
preliminary hearing held October 22, 1993. Transcript p. 42, 70-71.
Mr. Robert Terry Johnson's Defense Counsel's Sentencing Memorandum dated September 20,
1994, provides:
Mr. Johnson has contended all along that he voluntarily accompanied Mr.
Peterson into the house, helped tie up Rick Mangum, and had anal intercourse
with Connie Allen. Furthermore, Mr. Johnson has admitted from the outset that
he did nothing to stop Mr. Peterson. It was Mr. Johnson who eventually told the
police what had happened, even though Peterson threatened him, in the presence
of others, with death ifhe "snitched".
Robert Terry Johnson's Defense Counsel's Sentencing Memorandum, September 20, 1994, page
4.
Petitioner alleges:
"#2. New Evidence in the form of a signed and notarized affidavit of Thomas
Petersen stating unknown facts that would have supported my original criminal
defense and stopped me from entering into a plea agreement to save my life from
the Death Penalty."
8. Petitioner alleges there is new evidence in the form of a confession by Thomas Petersen
stating facts that were unknown to the Petitioner that would have stopped Petitioner from a plea
agreement and proved the Petitioner's innocence. The Petitioner is one of two living people that
were present when the murders occurred and cannot now be surprised and disadvantaged by any
alleged conspiracy against him. These issues would have been present at the time of the crimes
and/or prior to his plea negotiations and pleas of guilty. Therefore, these issues are all untimely.
Now, Petitioner contends that he only engaged in criminal behavior because he had to or his codefendant would have murdered him. Any necessity defense should have been intimatelyknown-

ANSWER-3
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to Petitioner and trial counsel from the very beginning because only Petitioner and his codefendant were aware of what really happened. Any such issue was timely then, and even for
the sake of argument assuming Petitioner has lately come into additional evidence confirming
facts Petitioner was aware of then, and the State does not concede that point, this Petition is
untimely. See also the response to paragraph 7. supra. Further, Petitioner waived any necessity
defense when he entered his guilty plea, and waived his right to appeal. Except for the above
response the State does not have sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of this
allegation, and therefore denies the allegation, reserving the right to amend this answer upon
further investigation.
Petitioner alleges:
"#3. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by S. Swensen, who also withheld
information about the withheld taped confession of Thomas Petersen and the
coverup that insued."
Petitioner also alleges:
"S. Swensen knew of the taped confession of Thomas Petersen and knew that the
Prosecutor was withholding the tape and the information on it. Swensen knew
that Peterson threaten to kill me if I did not do what he (petersen) said. Swensen
did not inform me or the Court of his knowledge of the tape recording, and the
information on it, adding to the conspiracy to hide evidence."
9.

Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, by Severt Swenson, m original Post

Conviction, Gooding County Case No. CV 1995-803, (previously designated SP-95-00196) for
withholding information/evidence and conflict of interest.

Petitioner's first petition for post

conviction relief largely dealt with allegedly unkept promises and attempted to throw out
Petitioner's confession as coerced by the Prosecution's underhandedness.
ANSWER-4
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Any conflict issue between Mr. Swenson and Petitioner should have been readily apparent to
Petitioner at the time of his first Petition for Post Conviction Relief and the time to deal with any
such conflict was during the course of that proceeding. The Register of Actions reveals that the
dismissal of the first Petition for Post Conviction Relief was not appealed. The State denies that
petitioner received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in any way at any stage of
the proceedings in Gooding County Case No. SP-95-00196, Petitioner's first Post Conviction
Relief case. Further, the State answers that petitioner's allegation is not a cognizable claim.
Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides no absolute right to counsel during post-conviction. Except for
the above response, the State does not have sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth
of this allegation, and therefore denies the allegation, reserving the right to amend this answer
upon further investigation.

Even if every allegation of Petitioner against counsel were true,

Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 688 (1984).
Petitioner alleges:
"#4. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for not filing an amended
Successive Post Conviction as he stated that he was going to.
#5. Inffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for not presenting
information/evidence pretaining to the arguments of the State on
timeliness of the filing of the Successive Post Conviction Petition,
once they were brought to his attention.
#6. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for not conducting
Discovery that he claimed he would do.
#7. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by David Heida for delaying Discovery and
obtaining affidavits too late to file before a known court date.

ANSWER-5
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#8. District Court error in not having a hearing on filed motions by the Petitioner
that were at the heart of the issues before the Court pretaining to the Summary
Dismissal that the Court was deciding on. Petitioner was trying to correct errors
by his counsel before the Court made a ruling."
Petitioner also alleges:
"David Heida deceived me into believing he was going to file an amended
Successive Post Conviction, that I asked him to do, to fix fundamental errors from
my filed Petition, especially dealing with the length of time it took me to file,
which is the heart of the reasoning for the Summary Dismissal. He claimed, in
writing, to be actively conducting a Discovery (obtaining Medical Records,
affidavits, and depositions) which he failed to do. I told him about why it took me
so long to file and the people that could write affidavits on my efforts to figure
out what to file and how to file in Court about the new evidence suddenly
presented to me by Thomas Petersen. Mr. Heida also failed to present facts that I
pointed out to him, in writing and in phone conversations, that pointed to the facts
about the missing tape (that a law enforcement officer testified that the tape was
missing, that the other tapes were already transcribed and in his possession, and
that he himself had possession of it at one time). Mr. Heida failed to inform the
Court of any facts the record showed that I told him about."
The State denies that petitioner received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in any
way at any stage of the proceedings in Gooding County Case No. CV 2009-399. Mr. Heide
requested the opportunity to conduct discovery. (ROA 9/14/2009). The State objected to Mr.
Heide's request to conduct discovery and filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to
conduct discovery. (ROA 9/25/2009). Further, the State answers that petitioner's allegations are
ANSWER-6
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not cognizable claims. Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides no absolute right to counsel during postconviction. Except for the above response, the State does not have sufficient information to
form a belief as to the truth of these allegations, and therefore denies the allegations, reserving
the right to amend this answer upon further investigation. Even if every allegation of Petitioner
against counsel were true, Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
Petitioner alleges:
"#9. Ineffective assistance of Counsel by Erik Lehtinen for not raising issues on
appeal about my filed motions before the District Court that were vacated for
some unknown reason, which has information on maternal facts of my Petiton.
#10. Ineffective assistance of Counsel of Erik Lehtinen for not presenting
issues/facts/caselaw properly in front of the Court."
Petitioner also alleges:
"Erik Lehtinen failed to bring up that I tried by filing motions in District Court, to
correct errors of my appointed attorney, that would have assisted my petition, and
could have saved the Courts much time and effort. Mr. Lehtinen also admitted to
me on the phone that a Idaho Supreme Court Justice told him that he failed' to
present the issues on timeliness properly before the Court and even called him a
liar."
Answering the allegations against Mr. Lehtinen, the state admits that the Petitioner was provided
counsel but denies the conclusory allegations, and as to the assertions of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the state denies the allegations. Even if every allegation of Petitioner against counsel
were true, Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
{
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In response to Petitioner's allegations in his "Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss," filed
March 29, 2013, that "[t]his Court is also using this Notice ofintent to Dismiss as a cover-up of
the Gooding County Prosecutor's lies in his Ex-Parte Motion to Extend Time to Respond .... "
(at page 6).
The State denies the Petitioner's conclusory allegations. The March 12, 2013 "Amended ExParte Motion to Extend Time For Response" corrected the March 6, 2013 "Ex-Parte Motion to
Extend Time For Response."
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Robert Terry Johnson's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent Robert Terry Johnson's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims
are procedurally defaulted.

Idaho Code § 19-4901(b). Further, the claims were waived by

agreement.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Robert Terry Johnson has failed to file his petition within the one year statute of
limitation and the claims are now time-barred. Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a).
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Robert Terry Johnson's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory
allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore
fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

ANSWER-8

Waiver, and/or issue preclusion, and/or collateral estoppel, and/or res judicata, and/or law
of the case and /or laches apply and Petitioner is therefore estopped from alleging now that his
confession prejudiced him.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner has filed a prior petition for post-conviction relief in state court. The State
specifically raises a successive petition/res judicata/law of the case/procedural default bar. Idaho
Code§ 19-4908.
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:

a)

That Robert Johnson's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;

b)

That Robert Johnson's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed;

c)

for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case.

DATEDthis»dayofApril,~ ,:(_,

&i-4

Luverne E. Shull
Gooding County Prosecuting Attorney

VERIFICATION
The Respondent, by and through Luverne E. Shull, being first duly sworn under oath,
deposes and says:
1)

I am the attorney for the Respondent in the above-entitled matter.

2)

That the facts contained in the foregoing Answer to Petitioner's Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief are true and correct to the best of my information and belief.

ANSWER-9
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2,5"Jl

day of April, 2013, I caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to:
Robert Johnson #27073
ICC/H210B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

U.S. Mail
Hand
Delivered
--- - -Overnight Mail

Steven McRae

X

Attorney at law

---

121 3rd Avenue East
Jerome, Idaho 83338

ANSWER-II

X

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

OF IDAHO
County of Gooding

)
) ss:
)

2~

I hereby certify that on this
day of April, I personally appeared before me. Luverne
E. Shull, who, being first duly sworn, declared that he is representing the Respondent in this
action, and that the statements contained in the foregoing document are believed to be true to the
best of my information and belief.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal on
the day and year first above written.

TRACEY MARTIN
Notary Public
State of Idaho
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Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at: UM.,...-6 Ct?,
My Commission Expires:

Idaho

~/~u
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Steven R McRae [!SB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcR.ae@MagicValleyLegal.com
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Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING
ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

vs.

)
)
)
)

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

Case No. CV-2013-84

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE
OF INTENT TO DISMISS

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Robert Johnson, by and through his attorney ofrecord, Steven
R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Reply to the Court's Notice of Intent to

Dismiss (the "Notice of Intene') (the "Reply•').

In the Notice of Intent, the Court sets forth

reasoning to dismiss Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for

rd Successive Post-Conviction Relief

(the "Petition"). This Reply is supported by the Affidavit of Robert Richard Jones, the Affidavit
ofRobert ""Johnson, and llie -:4fjiaavit oJErikLehtinen~·-·· ·-· ............. --

- - - - •••·---~M. - - -

Herein, Petitioner sets forth why his claims must be allowed to proceed. Petitioner
asserts herein that he has set forth enough evidence in his Petition so as to survive dismissal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). and Petitioner seeks this Court to direct that the

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - l

n
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proceedings should continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). Petitioner further asks that
the appointment of Steven R. McRae be expanded to allow Mr. McRae the ability to propose an
amended petition under the guidance provided herein pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), with
at least four (4) weeks to prepare the same. Petitioner seeks oral argument on this matter.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On June 24, I 994, Petitioner entered pleas of guilty to two counts of felony murder

pursuant to plea negotiations whereby the State would not seek the death penalty. On September
21, 1994, Petitioner was sentenced to fixed life with no possibility of parole. Pursuant to his plea
agreement, Petitioner did not appeal his sentence.
On November 30, 1995, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (the "1995
Post-Conviction Petition").

In filing the 1995 Post~Conviction Petition, Petitioner had not

individually prepared the documents for the case. Partial Supplemental Affidavit of Robert

Johnson ("Johnson .Affidavit '1, at 2. Petitioner utilized the services of an Inmate Law Clerk that
was provided to him at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution ("IMSI"), where Petitioner was
incarcerated at the time. Id.
Inmate Law Clerks, such as Robert Richard Jones, were utilized in IMSI to assist
inmates, interalia, with their post-conviction matters. Affidavit of Robert Richard Jones ("Jones

Affidavit") at 2. The Inmate Law Clerks would meet with inmates that had legal inquiries,
including on topics of post-conviction. Id. After the meeting with an inmate, the Inmate Law
Clerk would either provide advice to llie inmate, or the Inmate Law Clerk would draft the
required legal documents for the inmate. Id. If the Inmate Law Clerk determined that he/she
would draft the required legal documents for the inmate, it was often normal practice that the

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTBNTTO DISMISS- 2 •
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Inmate Law Clerk prepared the legal documents with very little involvement from the inmate.

Id.
In preparing the 1995 Post-Conviction Petition, Petitioner met with the Inmate Law Clerk
and explained his underlying criminal case. Johnson Affidavit, at 2. At that time, the Inmate
Law Clerk explained to Petitioner that the Inmate Law Clerk could help Petitioner. Id. The
Inmate Law Clerk took from Petitioner the documents that Petitioner had in regards to his
underlying criminal case.

Id.

The Inmate Law Clerk prepared all of the documents for

Petitioner's 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. Petitioner did not prepare the documents for his
1995 Post-Conviction Petition whatsoever, as he relied on the expertise of the Inmate Law Clerk.

Id. The Inmate Law Clerk also assisted Petitioner in filing the 1995 Post-Conviction Documents
with the Court in Gooding County.
Petitioner's 1995 Post-Conviction Petition was summarily dismissed on June 13, 1996.
Petitioner appealed the summary of dismissal of his petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in an
unpublished opinion, affinned the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. Johnson v.

Stare, 1997 Unpublished Opinion No. 617 (July 10, 1997). The remittitur was filed with the
District Court on August 11, 1997.
Sometime in 2009, Thomas Peterson, the alleged co-defendant in Petitioner's underlying
criminal case, handed Petitioner a notarized confession. Id. Such confession stated, in summary,
that: (a) Petitioner was very drunk to the point of barely walking, and Mr. Peterson took charge
anotlireatenea everyone, inclooing :Petffioii.er;-(6fMr.··reterso'i1completed the tying and cutting
himself and threatened death to Petitioner if he did not help; (c) Mr. Peterson gave the
information to the prosecutors and his defense attorneys during and after the investigation; and
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(d) Mr. Peterson's defense attorneys told Mr. Peterson to place blame on Petitioner so as to avoid
the death penalty. Id. at 2, and Exhibit A.
At that time, Mr. Peterson also informed Petitioner that Mr. Peterson had confessed to the

crimes that Petitioner was charged with and confessed that Petitioner was a victim on the night in
question - which confession was on an audio tape - before Mr. Peterson and Petitioner were
charged with the crime of murder as co-defendants. Id. at 2. Mr. Peterson further stated that he
had confessed to his lawyers, including Severt Swenson. Id. Mr. Peterson also told Petitioner

that Mr. Phillip Brown, the Gooding County Prosecutor at the time of Petitioner's underlying
criminal case, knew that Petitioner was a victim the night that Mr. Peterson committed the
murders and that Mr. Peterson had made an agreement with Mr. Swenson and Mr. Brown to
point the finger at Petitioner to save Mr. Peterson from facing the death penalty. Id. at 3.

Petitioner was unaware of the information, including the existence of a confession on an audio
tape, until Mr. Peterson gave Petitioner the notarized confession and stated the information. Id.
As soon as Petitioner could, he made an effort to contact the paralegal at the Idaho
Correctional Center ("ICC"), where he was incarcerated at the time, and Petitioner inquired how
to proceed with the new information. Id. At that time, Petitioner was aware that ICC no longer
employed Inmate Law Clerks. Id.
While Petitioner waited for the paralegal to allow his inquiry, Petitioner contacted his
aunt, Karen Devine, as soon as he could. Id. Petitioner asked his aunt to help find him an

attorney thatcould helpPetitioner determine now to procee<fwiththe new information fromMr. ---········-····Peterson. Id. Petitioner's aunt provided Petitioner with addresses of attorneys for Petitioner to
contact. Id. As soon as Petitioner was able, he wrote letters to all of the attorneys whose
addresses Petitioner's aunt provided. Id.
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After Petitioner was able to meet with the paralegal at ICC, the paralegal informed
Petitioner that he was not an attorney and could not give Petitioner advice on what to do or how

to proceed. Id.
Only one attorney replied to Petitioner's letter, Dennis Benjamin. Id. Petitioner spoke
with Mr. Benjamin on the telephone as soon as he was able and allowed to do the same. Id. Mr.
Benjamin told Petitioner that the proper way to use the new information was to file another postconviction petition. Id. Until his conversation with Mr. Benjamin, which was in May of 2009.
Petitioner was unaware that the proper procedure to use the information was to file another post-

conviction petition. Id. at 4. Also, Petitioner was unaware that he had the legal ability to file a
subsequent post-conviction petition after filing his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id.
At his next available time, Petitioner again visited the paralegal of ICC and requested a
packet of documents for post-conviction petitioners. Id. Petitioner completed the work on the
post-conviction papers, which took considerable time, despite Petitioner's best efforts to
complete the packet. Id. It took weeks for Petitioner to request the packet, receive the packet,
fill out the information needed in the packet. request an appointment to make copies of the
packet, request an appointment in ICC for notary services and to mail out the completed packet.
Id.
On July 29, 2009, Petitioner filed his Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (the
"2009 Post-Conviction Petition"), in which Petitioner alleged. in part, that the State had withheld
exculpatory evictence in the form of statements of Mr. PeterSon that exonerated Petitioner from
involvement in the murders.
The State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal based upon the merits and on the basis
that the petition was untimely. Petitioner informed his attorney on the 2009 Post-Conviction
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Petition. David Heida, of the facts as contained above in in regards to the process of filing both
his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition and the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. Mr. Heida did not

use the information in representing Petitioner in the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition in combatting
the argument that the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition should be dismissed as untimely. Id. The
2009 Post-Conviction Petition was dismissed by the District Court on the merits and also on the

basis that the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition was untimely.

Petitioner's case was transferred to the Idaho State Appellate Public Defender's Office
("SAPD"), where Erik Lehtinen represented Petitioner. Ajfidavif of Erik R. Lehtinen ("Lehtinen
Affidavit"), at 1. Mr. Lehtinen noted in his representation that Petitioner's counsel, David Heida

and Isaac Keppler, never made a record of why it took Petitioner approximately four months to

file the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Id. at 3. However, Mr. Lehtinen did not perceive the
timeliness challenge as credible, and therefore only cursorily addressed it in his briefing. Id. at
3-4. The briefing from the State at the appellate level was primarily directed at the issue of
timeliness. Id. at 4. The State primarily argued that Petitioner had failed to make a factual

showing of the unique facts of the case and why Petitioner had filed his petition within a
"reasonable time". Id. at 4-5.
Mr. Lehtinen regretted that he did not have a record of the specific reasons why it took
Petitioner approximately four months to file his successive petition and made the ·alternate
arguments that 1) four (4) months simply was a "reasonable time" for an indigent, incarcerated
prose petitioner to file a

successfoepetfffon-ancr2ra·'"reasonabie time" standard in n()n-cap:ffac·--·- ····-----

cases should be defined in terms of usual statute of limitation in non-capital post-conviction
cases (of one year). Id. at 6. The Court of Appeals affinned the dismissal of the 2009 PostConviction Petition solely on the basis that it was untimely filed and did not address the merits of
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Petitioner's 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Johnson v. State. 2011 Unpublished Opinion No.
574 (August 8, 201 l). Mr. Lehtinen believes that the Court of Appeals may have reached a
different conclusion had Petitioner had a better record detailing the specific reasons why the
2009 Post-Conviction Petition was not filed until approximately four months after his discovery
of the Brady evidence / violation. Id. at 8.
Mr. Lehtinen filed a timely petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, in which

he argued that review should be granted in order for the Supreme Court to resolve the question
left unanswered by Pizzuto - whether the "reasonable time" standard in non-capital cases should
be defined in terms of usual statute of limitations in non-capital post-conviction cases. i.e., one
year. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court granted review. Id. The State argued, interalia, that the
Supreme Court's grant of review should be withdrawn as improvidently granted because
Petitioner had, in the original Appellant's Brief, "advocated for application of the case-by-case
analysis of what constitutes a reasonable delay in asserting a newly discovered claim," and then
changed his approach in his Reply Brief. "arguing for the first time that any delay less than one
year was automatically reasonable." Id. After briefing against the State's brief, at oral argument
in the matter, Mr. Lehtinen conceded that the Pizzuto case had not been cited in the opening
brief. but made argument that it was nevertheless properly considered. Id. at 10. Ultimately, the

Supreme Court entered an Order Dismissing Appellant's Petition for Review because '1ihe issue
this Court initially wanted to address on review was not raised in Appellant's opening brief on
review [sic] ... " (emphasis m origmair

Id.-···--·-·-·-···--·····-·······-·-·

Mr. Lehtinen concedes that had he presented the Pizzuto argument in petitioner's opening
brief on appeal, "presumably the Supreme Court would not have dismissed the petition for
review and. instead, would have reached the merits of the Pizzuto argument." Id. at 11.
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DISCUSSION
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding. Hall v. State, 151

Idaho 42, 45 (2011 ). The summary dismissal of a post-conviction action is permissible when the
petitioner fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in his or her favor, would
entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. Idaho Code § 19-4906; Murphy v. Stare, 143 Idaho
139, 145 (Ct. App. 2006).

A court may only dismiss a petition when there is no issue of material fact. Kirkland v.

State, 143 Idaho 544, 546 (Idaho 2006). "Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to
LC.§ J9w4906(b) is the equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Dunlap v. State,

126 Idaho 901, 904 (Idaho App. 1995) (citing Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87 (Ct. app. 1987)
(emphasis added)).
Like tlte plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegatiom upon wl,ich tl,e request for
post-conviction relief is based. An application Jot post-conviction relief
differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, however, for an

application must contain much more than 'a short and plain statement of
the claim' that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(I).
Rather, an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and
affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence in
not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903.

Chouinard v. State, 127 Idaho 836,838 (Idaho App. 1995) (emphasis added). Thus, when there
exists a material issue of fact, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition is not warranted.

dismissing the post-conviction petition was incorrect because there existed a material issue of
fact as to the elements of the petitioner>s claim).
As to successive post-conviction petitioners. Petitioner bears the burden to establish

sufficient reason as to why the ground for relief was not asserted in his original petition or was
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - 8 -
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inadequately asserted in his original petitioner or that any waiver of an asserted claim was not
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. LC. § 19-4908. As this Court has cited in the
Notice of Intent, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated in relation to successive post-conviction
petitions:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant undei· the UPCPA must be

raised in an applicant's original, supplemental, or amended application. LC.
§ l 9M4908. The language of Section 19-4908 prohibits successive
application in those cases where the applicant "knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently" waived the grounds for relief sought in the successive
application or offers "no sufficient reason'' for omitting those grounds in the
original application. See Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d

955, 957 (1981). llowever, Section 19-4908 allows an applicant to raise a
ground for relief, w/1ich was addressed in a former application, if he or
she can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was inadequately
raised or presented in tlte initial post-conviction action. See Hernandez v.
Staret 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789. 793 (Ct. App. 1999). An
allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post"
conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction
counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason frl,r permitting issues that were
inadequately presented to he presented in a subsequent application for
post-conviction relie[.
(Emphasis added).
1.

PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW THAT DAVID HEIDA
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AS PETITIONER'S COUNSEL IN PETITIONER'S

2009 POST-CONVICTION PETITION IN FAILING TO ARGUE FACTS TO SHOW THAT
PETITIONER TIMELY FILED THE 2009 POST-CONVICTION PETITION.
Petitioner asserts that he has established sufficient facts yo avoid summary dismissal in
his allegation that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from David Heida in his 2009
Post-Conviction Petition 1• To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel so as to avoid

--------·------

summary dismissal, Petitioner must show that there was a genuine issue of material fact on two
elements:

1) that Petitioner's counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and 2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors. the
1

Petitioner notes that below, in Section 3, Petitioner addresses the procedural application of Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of David Heida as counsel under the ruling in Palmer v. Dermitt.
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - 9 •
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See, generally. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668. 687-88 (1984).

First, Mr. Heida's performance foll below an objective standard of reasonableness when
he failed to assert a. factual basis - and thereby create a factual record - of Petitioner's process in
filing his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Petitioner, in the least, has created a genuine issue of
material fact in the same. Petitioner informed Mr. Heida of the factual basis in his filing of both
his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition and the 2009 Post-Conviction Petition as is contained in the

Johnson Affidavit and is described supra and infra. However, Mr. Heida never used said
information to create a factual record to be the basis of an argument that Petitioner filed his 2009
Post-Conviction Petition within a "reasonable time" as is described infra. It is clear that without
this factual record, Petitioner could not make an argument on the "case-by-case" basis, as is
described infra.

Thus, it is clear that Mr. Heida fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness because any competent counsel would have set forth a factual basis to justify
Petitioner's filing of his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition.
Second, there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. In the very least, Petitioner has established a genuine
issue ofma.terial fact in the same with the affidavits of Petitioner. Robert Richard Jones, and Erik
Lehtinen. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) sets forth the standard that
when a successive petition for post-conviction is filed. the same must be filed within a
~·reasonabletime''oftheaiscovery oflnformation tliat was not previousiyknown or coulo_n_o_t_ _ ,__ _
have been known by the petitioner. The Court stated:

In capital cases, this Court has required that successive petitions for postconviction relief be filed within a reasonable time. (Citation omitted).
This "reasonable time" standard is not specifically stated in LC. § 192719, which governs successive petitions in capital cases. Rather, the
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reasonable time standard is based on this Court's construction of statutory
language barring claims that a defendant knew or reasonably should have
known within 42 days after judgment was filed. As the Court has
construed I.C. § 19-2719, a defendant may bring claims that he did not
know or could not reasonably have known so long as those claims are
brought within a reasonable time ... The trial court's analysis of
"sufficient reason" permitting the filing of a successive petition must
necessarily include an analysis of whether the claims being made were
asserted within a reasonable period of time. In determining what a
reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, we will simply consider
it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases.

Id. at 904-05, 174 P.3d at 874-75 (2007) (Emphasis added).
Petitioner asserts that the facts as set forth herein and in the affidavits of Petitioner and
Robert Richard Jones, shows that he filed his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition within a reasonable
time, and had Mr. Heida argued the same, Petitioner would have thus survived a challenge of
untimeliness from the State during his 2009 Post~Conviction Petition. The facts are as follows:

1.

Sometime in 2009, Thomas Peterson, the alleged co-defendant in Petitioner's underlying
criminal case, handed Petitioner a notarized confession and provided Petitioner with the

informati011 that was the basis for this 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Johnson Affidavit
at 2-3. As soon as Petitioner could, he made an effort to contact the paralegal at the ICC,
where he was incarcerated at the time, and inquired how to proceed with the new
information. Id. At that time, Petitioner was aware that ICC no longer employed Inmate
Law Clerks (as was the case when he filed the 1995 Post-Conviction Petition, as
described infra). Id.
.--wliilePetiboner waitea-fortlie pamlegat··toalloW·liisinqiiizy;-Petitioner conta.aoo-Jiis

aunt, Karen Devine, as soon as he could. Id. Petitioner asked his aunt to help find him
an attorney that could help Petitioner determine how to proceed with the new information
froni Mr. Peterson. Id. Petitioner's aunt provided Petitioner with addresses of attorneys
for Petitioner to contact. Id. As soon as Petitioner was able, he wrote letters to all of the
PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMlSS • 11 •
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attorneys whose addresses Petitioner's aunt provided. ld. After Petitioner was able to
meet with the paralegal at ICC. the paralegal informed Petitioner that he was not an
attorney and could not give Petitioner advice on what to do or how to proceed. Id.
3.

Only one attorney replied to Petitioner's letter, Dennis Benjamin. Id. Petitioner spoke

with Mr. Benjamin on the telephone as soon as he was able and allowed. Id. Mr.
Benjamin told Petitioner that the proper way to use the new information was to file
another post-conviction petition. Id. Until his conversation with Mr. Benjamin, which
was in May of 2009, Petitioner was unaware that the proper procedure to use the
information was to file another post-conviction petition. Id. at 4. Also, Petitioner was
unaware that he had the legal ability to file a subsequent post-conviction petition after
filing his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Id.
4.

At his next available time. Petitioner again visited the paralegal of ICC and requested a
packet of documents for post-conviction petitioners. Id. Petitioner completed the work
on the post-conviction papers. which took some time, despite Petitioner's best efforts to
complete the packet. Id. It took weeks for Petitioner to request the packet. receive the
packet, fill out the infom1ation needed in the packet, request an appointment to make
copies of the packet, request an appointment in ICC for notary services and to mail out
the completed packet. Id.

5.

On July 29, 2009, Petitioner filed his Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (the
'2009 Post-Conviction Petition''), in wliicli '.Petitioner alleged, in part, that the State had

withheld exculpatory evidence in the form of statements of Mr. Peterson that exonerated
Petitioner from involvement in the murders.
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All of the foregoing facts show that Petitioner was expeditious in seeking out infonnation
on how to file the new information with the court, seeking out legal counsel, obtaining the
required documents, filling out the documents while being restrained in his actions (from being
in custody)i and filing the documents with the Court. Because of the expeditious manner in
which he completed all of these acts. Petitioner has clearly demonstrated sufficient facts so as to
survive summary dismissal - as there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Petitioner
filed his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition within a "reasonable time'\
Furthennore, in the Notice of Intent, the Court infers that because Petitioner had filed the

1995 Post-Conviction Petition, that he was thus familiar with the process and knew how to use
the infonnation as was provided to him by Mr. Peterson. Thus, the Court concludes, "The
petitioner, [sic] clearly new [sic] how to go about filing a petition for post~conviction relief."

Notice of Intent at 8. However, upon review of the facts in this matter, this inference is not
correct, or the Petitioner has at least raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
inference is incorrect. The facts supporting this conclusion are as follows:

1.

On November 30, 1995, Petitioner filed the "1995 PostwConviction Petition". In filing
the 1995 Post-Conviction Petition. Petitioner had not individually prepared the

docuroents for the case. Johnson Affidavit at 2. Petitioner utilized the services of an
Inmate Law Clerk that was provided to him at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution
("IMSI"), where Petitioner was incarcerated at the time. Id.

2-.--In preparing tlie f9"93-Post-ConviciionPetHion, Petitioner met withtlie Inmate Law Clerl<
and explained his underlying criminal case. Johnson Affidavit, at 2. At that time, the
Inmate Law Clerk explained to Petitioner that the Inmate Law Clerk could help

Petitioner. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk took form Petitioner the documents that Petitioner
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had in regards to his underlying criminal case. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk prepared all of
the documents for Petitioner's 1995 Post-Conviction Petition.

Id. Petitioner did not

prepare the documents for his 1995 Post-Conviction Petition whatsoever, as he relied on
the expertise of the Inmate Law Clerk. Id. The Inmate Law Clerk also assisted Petitioner
in filing the 1995 Post-Conviction Documents with the Court in Gooding County. Id.
All of this was a regular practice and procedure of Inmate Law Clerks at that time. Jones

Affidavit at 1-2.
Petitioner clearly relied entirely on the Inmate Law Clerk in filing his 1995 PostConviction Petition. Petitioner had only minimal involvement in filing the 1995 Post-Conviction
Petition, and the Inmate Law Clerk handled the matter for him. In contrast, in 2009, Petitioner
had virtually no person on whom to rely in helping him file a post~conviction petition. The
paralegal at ICC offered him no advice. and Petitioner was completely on his own in determining
how to proceed. These facts show a clear contrast in facts in the Petitioner's filing of his two
separate post-conviction petitions. As such, Petitioner again asserts that he has raised sufficient
facts to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Court was correct in asserting that
Petitioner was familiar with the post-conviction process and knew how to use the infonnation as
was provided to him by Mr. Peterson.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner asserts that he has established both prongs of
proving ineffective assistance of counsel of David Heida in his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition
and aslcs7liis Court to airect that the proceedings shoula-continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19.
4906(b).
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2. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW THAT ERIK LEHTINEN
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AS PETITIONER'S APPELLATE COUNSEL IN
PETITIONER'S 2009 POST-CONVICTION PETITION IN FAILING TO CITE PIZZUTO IN
THE OPENING BRIEF OF PETITIONER'S APPEAL.

In the event that the Court does not find that Petitioner has alleged sufficient facts as to
survive summary dismissal as to David Heida's representation of Petitioner in the 2009 PostConviction Petition, Petitioner further alleges that Erik Lehtinen was ineffective as Petitioner's
counsel on the appeal of 2009 Post-Conviction Petition. Mr. Lehtinen admits in his affidavit that

he should have cited and argued Pizzuto in his opening brief on appeal. Lehtinen Affidavit 11.
He also admits that because he did not do so, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the review of
Petitioner's case. Id. He finally states, "As the Pizzuto argument is a meritorious one. which
may have ultimately been adopted, and as the petition and [its] supporting material raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the State wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence,
there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have turned out differently had I explicitly
raised the Pizzuto argument in the opening brief on appeal." Id.
Thus. Petitioner has raised at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he has
satisfied the two prongs of Strickland in proving ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Lehtinen,
at the appellate level of the 2009 Post-Conviction Case.
3. TaE DOCTRIN£.S OF RES JtJDlCA'l'A ANO LAW OF TOE CASE DO NOT AP:VL:V ONl>ta
THE RULING lN PAlMER V. DERMITT, W8lCH HAS BEEN FOLLOWEJ) NOMEROOS
TIMES BY THE APPELLAT.& COURTS IN IDAHO.

Petitioner in this matter must be allowed to proceed to seek a finality of the issues raised

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -..··--··-· -··········-···· ·····--·

in his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition under Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955,
957 (1981), which does not violate the doctrines of Res Judicata or Law of the Case. In Palmer,

the Idaho Supreme Court considered allegations by Palmer that his original post-conviction
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counsel was ineffective. which warranted his ability to bring again his post-conviction arguments
until finality was reached on the issues of the arguments. Id.
Under what the Court deemed the "finality rule", the Court allowed Palmer to reassert his
arguments anew. The Court~ in considering the language of Idaho Code § 19-4908, related the

words of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies, which
state, in part, "(ii) A question lias been fully andfinally litigated when tire liigl,est court of tlie

state to wliicl, a defendant can appeal as of right has ruled on the merits of the question.
Finality is an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the state. (b) Claims advanced

in post-conviction applications should be decided on theit merits, even though they might have
been, but were not, fully and finally litigated in the proceedings leading to the judgments of
conviction... Id. (Emphasis added). The Court finally ruled:
Tlie allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post~eonviction
counsel, if true, would warrant a finding tltat lite omission in tlie
prior post-conviction proceeding of the allegations now being
raised anew by Palmer was not a result of an active, knowing
choice made by Palmer tlirough tltis prior court-appointed
attorney, and would therefore provide sufficient reason for
permitting the newly asserted allegations to he raised in the
instant petition. Other jurisdictions have similarly heW that a

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or prior postconviction counsel provides sufficient reason to permit newly
asserted allegations to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction
proceeding. See Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1980);
Curtis v. State, 37 Md. App. 459, 381 A.2d 1166 (1978) rev'd on
other grounds; Stewart v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 92 Nev.
588. 555 P.2d 218 (1976).
Tcl. af59o.63YP:2aa:rw,o-09s1nEmpliasisaaaeaJ;-··········· ···· ·····-·--·----····--

It is important to note that in Palmer, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that an issue on
which Palmer had reached finality by taking through the appellate process - the felony
impeachment rule-must be barred by the doctrine of the Law of the Case. Id. at 595,635 P.2d

at 959 (1981 ). However, on the issues that Palmer was denied finality because his prior postPETITIONER'S lml>LY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS • 16 •
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conviction counsel was ineffective, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the district court erred in
summarily dismissing the issues (and did not render the issues warrantless under the doctrines of
Res Judicata or Law of the Case). Id. at 596, 635 P.2d at 960 (1981). As such, the only logical
inference is that the finality rule as set forth in Palmer - which allows a post-conviction
petitioner to proceed on claims he has brought forth in a prior post-conviction petition - does not
violate the principles of Res Judicata or Law of the Case.
The finality rule in Palmer has been followed in other Idaho

cases. See Hernandez

State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999); Baker v.

v.

Stare, 142 Idaho 411,

420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An allegation that a claim was not adequately

presented in the first post-conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel, if true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were
inadequately presented to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief...);
and Schwanz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (a. App. 2008) ("failing to
provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims

presented may be violative of due process.") Petitioner notes that the Court in this matter cited

all of the above referenced cases in the Notice ofintent. See Notice ofIntent, 4. 5. and 10.
In this matter, Petitioner has set forth his argument that David Heida, his attorney on his
2009 Post-Conviction Petition. was ineffective in failing to argue the facts and establish that
Petitioner filed his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition within a "reasonable time" so as to survive
summary dismissal as set forth supra. PUrsuant to Palmer, Petitioner seeks to reassert all of the
grounds that were ruled to be untimely in his 2009 Post-Conviction Petition by the Idaho Court
of Appeals, so as to seek finality of his claims on the merits. As such, Petitioner requests that the
Court direct that the proceedings should continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b).

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DlSMISS - 17 -

G

25

07-03-'13 14:48 FROM-Hepworth &Assoc.

208-736-0041

T-346 P0019/0020 F

Additionally, Petitioner has set forth his argument that Erik Lehtinen, his appellate
attorney on his 2009 Post~Conviction Petition, was ineffective in failing to cite Pizzuto in
Petitioner's opening appellate brief. In the event that the Court does not believe that Petitioner
has adequately proven sufficient facts so as to survive summary dismissal on the timeliness issue
- and that Mr. Heida provided ineffective assistance of counsel on the same - pursuant to

Palmer, Petitioner seeks then to reassert all of the ground that were ruled to be untimely in his
2009 Post-Conviction Petition by the Idaho Court of Appeals, so as to seek finality of his claims
on the merits by being able to include an argument under Pizzuto that a "reasonable time''
standard in non-capital cases should be defined in terms of usual statute of limitations in noncapital post-conviction cases, i.e., one year. As such. Petitioner requests that the Court direct
that the proceedings should continue pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b).

Petitioner finally notes that his present counsel. Steven R. McRae, has not had an
opportunity to prepare an amended petition or a motion to amend the petition in this matter,
given his limited appointment as set forth in Order re: Appointment of Counsel filed on April 22,

2013. As such, Petitioner requests that the Court allow Mr. McRae the ability to propose an
amended petition under the guidance provided herein pursuant to Idaho Code § l 9-4906(b), with
at least four (4) weeks to prepare the same.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that the Court, pursuant to Idaho Code §

19-4906(6) direct tJ:iat the proceedings contii:iiie."'.P'etitioner]urtlier askstliat llie appointment of
Steven R. McRae be expanded to allow Mr. McRae the ability to propose an amended petition
under the guidance provided herein pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b), with at least four (4)
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weeks to prepare the same. Additionally; Petitioner requests an oral hearing on this matter for all
issues raised.
DATED this 3rd day of July, 2013.

McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
By:~~--Steven R. McRae

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of July, 2013, I served a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document upon the following:
Gooding County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 86
Gooding, ID 83330
Fax: (208) 934-4494

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

-----------------------··--·····----

PETITIONER'S REPLY TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS - 19 -

257

07-03-'13 14:57 FROM-Hepworth &Assoc.

STATE OF IDAHO

208-736-0041

T-352 Plil01il2/lil013 F

)

:ss
County of Ada

)

COMES NOW Erik R. Lehtinen, and swears and affirms under oath and upon his
personal knowledge the following:
1.

I am currently employed by the Idaho state Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD")
as the Chief of the Appellate Unit. I have served in this capacity for over a year.
Prior to that, I served as a Deputy State Appellate Public Defender for
approximately eight years.

2.

On or about February 3, 2010, the SAPD was appointed to represent Robert
Terry Johnson in his appeal from the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief in Gooding County Case No. CV 2009-399
(originally designated Supreme Court No. 37378; later re-designated Supreme
Court No. 39433).

3.

Originally, Mr. Johnson's appeal was assigned to another attorney at the SAPD
(Sarah Tompkins); however, well before the Appellant's Brief was flied, the case

was re-assigned to me. From that point forward, I had exclusive responsibility for
Mr. Johnson1s appeal.
4.

Based on my work as Mr. Johnson's appellate counsel, I have personal
knowledge of all matters set forth herein.

_ _ ___,5=-·---=UP-on reviewing the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript, I came to the belief
that the district court ·erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Johnson's Brady claim.
Thus, the claim presented on appeal was stated as follows: "Did the district court
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err in summarily dismissing the Brady claim presented in Mr. Johnson's
successive petition for post-conviction relief?"

6.

In arguing this claim in the Appellant's Brief, there were three arguments that I
felt needed to be made: first, it had to be made clear that Mr. Johnson's petition
(and the supporting materials} raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if

resolved in his favor, would have established a Brady violation which would have
entitled him to post-conviction relief; second, there was need to e:xplain why
Mr. Johnson's Brady claim was properly presented in a successive petition for
post-conviction relief; and third, because the district court seemed to have
dismissed Mr. Johnson's Brady claim, in part, on timeliness grounds, a brief
explanation of why that claim was, in fact, timely, was warranted.
7.

At the time, I did not view the timeliness issue as a serious impediment

to

Mr. Johnson obtaining relief. This was so for two reasons:

a. First, below, the state had not made a credible or compelling argument
contes1ing the timeliness of the Brady claim (see Brief in Support of
Motion for Summary Disposition - Dismissal, pp.14-15 (Oct. 13, 2009)
(citing one Idaho case holding that a successive petition filed within 42
days of learning of the facts underlying the claim was filed within a
"reasonable time," and citing another case holding that a successive
petition filed four years after learning of the relevant facte was not filed
within a ''reasonable time"); Subsequent Brief in Support of Motion for
Summary Disposition - Dismissal, pp.12-13 (Dec. 24, 2009) (arguing that
the Brady material at issue was known to Mr. Johnson as of the date of his
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preliminary hearing back in 1993)); Mr. Johnson's successive postconviction counsel (David Heida and Isaac Keppler) never made a record
of why ft took Mr. Johnson approximately four months to file his
successive petition after receiving evidence of the Brady violation; and the

district court appeared not to have been totally convinced that the Brady
claim was untimely (see Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for
Summary Dismissal, pp.29-30 (discussing the fact that Mr. Johnson's
successive petition was filed approximately four months after receiving
evidence of the Brady violation; noting that the relevant legal question was
whether the petition was filed within a "reasonable timen of learning of the

Brady violation; acknowledging that, "[a)s to the Brady violation, it is less
clear whether it is untimely"; and never explicitly ruling that the Brady
claim was. in fact, untimely)).

b. Second, and much more importantly, I did not perceive there to be a
remotely credible argument that Mr. Johnson's successive petition was not
filed within a "reasonable time."

I firmly believed that the filing of a

successive post-conviction petition by an Indigent, incarcerated, pro se
petitioner within approximately four months of receiving evidence of a

Brady violation in his criminal case was infinitely reasonable under any
colorable standard for defining a •'reasonable time."

In part. this was

because I was aware of no Idaho appellate decision which had ever held
that post-conviction petition in a non-capital case, filed after a delay
significantly less than a year, was filed outside Of a "reasonable time.''
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Specifically, the shortest time period I was aware of, in which it had been
said in a non-capital case that a time period less than a year was not a
"reasonable time," was the 51 weeks considered to be unreasonable in

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191-92 (Ct. App. 2008}.
8.

Because I did not perceive there to be a credible argument that Mr. Johnson's

successive petition was time-barred as not having been filed within a "reasonable
time/I in the Appellanfs Brief, I addressed the timeliness issue somewhat
cursorily, simply identifying the applicable "reasonable time" standard, and
pointing out that under the basic facts of Mr. Johnson's case a successive
petition filed within approximately four months was clearly filed within a
"reasonable time." {See Appellant's Brief, pp.33-34.) At the time, I was aware
that the "reasonable timen standard was problematic because it was poorly
defined under Idaho law; however, I saw no need to open "Pandora's Box" by

trying to define the ••reasonable timen standard because, as noted, I believed it
beyond cavil that Mr. Johnson's successive petition was flied within a
"reasonable time" under any colorable interpretation of that standard,
9.

I was quite surprised when I received the State's Respondent's Brief in
Mr. Johnson's appeal, and discovered that the State's primary argument: on
appeal was that Mr. Johnson's successive petition had been properly dismissed
because Mr. Johnson failed to establish that he filed his petition within a
"reasonable time." (See Respondenfs Brief, pp.8-10.) In making this argument,
the State contended that what is a "reasonable time" is evaluated on a case-by•
case basis and that, in the absence of some affirmative explanation on the record
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of why it took him four months to file his successive petition, Mr. Johnson failed
to show, under the facts of his case, that his petition was flied within a
reasonable time. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.)

10.

The State's focus on the timeliness of Mr. Johnson's petition and 1 in particular,
ifs claim that under the unique facts of circumstances of his case he had failed to
show that his petition was filed within a "reasonable time," necessitated a
discussion of just what the "reasonable time" standard means, and how it ought
to apply to Mr. Johnson's case. Thus, in preparing Mr. Johnson's Reply Brief, I
had to delve into "Pandora's Box. n

11.

In the Reply Brief, I argued that a "reasonable time" should no longer be judged
on a case-by-case basis because, although Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900

(2007), had required as much in non-capital cases, a year later, in Pizzuto v.
State, 146 Idaho 720 (2008), a capital case, the Idaho Supreme Court had
recognized that a case-by-case approach to determining whether a post•
conviction petition was flied within a "reasonable time" is problematic, and it
abandoned that approach (at least in capital cases) and applied the statutory

time limit for bringing post-conviction claims generaUy-in that case, 42 days, as
set forth under I.C. § 19-2719, the capital post-conviction statute. Accordingly, I
argued that a "reasonable time" for Mr. Johnson to have filed his successive
petition should be measured by the statutory time limit for bringing postconviction claims generally as well-one year, as set forth under I.C. § 19-4902,
the non-capital post-conviction statute. Alternatively, I argued that even if the

Pizzuto reasoning did not apply to non-capital oases, such that the question of
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11

whether Mr. Johnson's petition was filed within a 11reasonable time had to be
judged on the unique facts and circumstances of his case, the reality is that
Mr. Johnson's filing of a successive petition in only about four months was
reasonable.
12.

With regard to the latter (alternative) argument, although I believed it
unquestionable that the approximately four months at issue in this case was weU
within a "reasonable time" for an indigent incarcerated pro se petitioner to file a
successive petition (see 1} 7(b), supra), the fact is that when I realized the State
was actually going to pursue the "timeliness" issue, I regretted that I did not have
a record of the specific reasons why it took Mr. Johnson approximately four

months to file his successive petition. I knew (because, throughout the pendency
of the appeal, Mr. Johnson repeatedly explained it to me) exactly why it took
Mr. Johnson a number of months to file his successive petition; however,
because those reasons were never placed into the record by Mr. Johnson's
successive post-conviction counsel, I was forbidden from discussing them on

appeal. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714 {2007).
13.

In particular, Mr. Johnson told me that when he first learned of the Brady

evidence/violation, he had no idea what to do with it. He told me he did not know
what to file {/.a., a motion in his criminal case, a motion in his first post-conviction
_ _ _ _ _ _c.,..a....,s..,..e,

a new ~tition for P-Ost-conviction relief, a P-etition for a writ of habeas

corpus, or some other document), or where to file it (i.e., in state court or in
federal court). If I recall correctly, he said he wasted a significant amount of time
trying to hire an attorney himself; then, when that failed, ha tried to get advice
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from his family; and, finally, he relied on his family to try to hire an attorney, which
also failed.

All of this would have been time-consuming under the best of

circumstances, but" for reasons which should be obvious, Mr. Johnson indicated it
was an extraordinarily difficult and slow process for him while he was
incarcerated and without funds. Ultimately, Mr. Johnson said, these efforts were
all unsuccessful.

He then attempted

paralegal, he said. ff I recall

to seek assistance from the prison

correctly, Mr. Johnson indicated that he had to wait

weeks for his appointments with the paralegal and, making matters worse, I
believe he told me that he needed multiple appointments with the paralegal
before he was in a position to start putting the &uccessive petition together. Had
this information been made part of the record below, such that it would have
been proper for me to present it on appeal, I certainly would have presented this
Information in response to the State's "timeliness" argument. Nevertheless, I still
firmly believed that our briefing demonstrated that Mr. Johnson's successive

petition was timely filed regardless of which standard might apply.
14.

Mr. Johnson's case was originally assigned to the Court of Appeals, which
declined the State's request for oral argument

15.

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
summary dismissal of Mr. Johnson's successive petition,

It reasoned that

Mr. Johnson's successive P-etitlon was untimely. \JY'lth regard to the question of
how to define a "reasonable time," the Court of Appeals declined to extend the
reasoning of Pizzuto to non-capital cases, holding as follows: 'While Charboneau
was decided one year prior to Pizzuto, the Court's decision in Pizzuto was limited
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to capital cases and did not expressly overrule Charboneau 1s reasonable time
standard for successive applications filed in noncapital cases. Thus, we decline
to extend the rationale of Pizzuto to conclude that a reasonable time for filing a
successive application in a noncapital case is one year. 11 Applying a case-bycase approach, the Court of Appeals concluded, without any analysis
whatsoever, that "Johnson has failed to establish that he filed his successive

application wHhin a reasonable time."
16.

To this day, I respectfully disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusions-both

its continued adherence to Charboneau, even after Pizzuto, and its conclusory
holding that approximately four months was not a "reasonable time" for
Mr. Johnson to have filed his successive petition.

With regard to the latter

holding, although I believe the Court of Appeals was incorrect to have held that
the approximately four months at issue was not a "reasonable time" based on the
record before the it, t believe that the Court of Appeals may have reached a
different conclusion had I had a better record detailing the specific reasons why
Mr. Johnson's successive petition was not filed until approximately four months
after his discovery of the Brady evidenceMolation.
17.

Following issuance of the Court of Appeals' opinion, I filed a timely petition for
review with the Idaho Supreme Court.

In the brief supporting that motion, I

_ _ _ _ _ _-argued that review should be granted in order for tile Supreme Court to resolve
the question left unanswered in Pizzuto-whether the "reasonable time" standard
in non-capital cases should be defined in terms of usual statute of limitations in
non-capital post-conviotion cases,

i.e., one year.
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18.

The Supreme Court granted review.

19.

In its Respondent's Brief on Review, the State argued, inter alia, that the Court's
grant of review should be withdrawn as improvidently granted because
Mr. Johnson had, in the original Appellant's Brief, "advocated for application of
the case-by-case analysis of what constitutes a reasonable delay in asserting a
newly discovered claim/ and then changed his approach in his Reply Brief,
"arguing for the first time that any delay less than one year was automatically
reasonable."

Therefore, the State reasoned, "the Idaho Court of Appeals

ultimately applied the legal standard advocated by Johnson on appeal." On the
"timelness" issue, the State also argued that, contrary to what had been argued
in the Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, this area of the law is
11

settled" and the reasoning of Pizzuto does not apply to non-capital cases, and

that, under the facts and circumstances of his case, Mr. Johnson failed to show
that his petition was flied within a "reasonable time."
20.

The State's Respondent's Brief on Review warranted a response. Thus, I filed

an Appellant's Reply Brief on Review. In that brief, r argued that review had not
been improvidently granted. I pointed out that the State was incorrect Insofar as
it claimed that a case-by-case approach to determining whether a succes~ive

petition was filed within a "reasonable time" had been "advocated" in the original
-------L-!AP-P-ellant's

Brief, and

I argued why the

State's

waiver/forfeiture theories were without legal merit.

11

invited error" and

i also explained why the

State's argument that the law in this area is "settledn was without merit. Finally,

AFFIDAVIT OF ERIK R. LEHTINEN ... Page 9

C 266

07-03-'13 14:58 FROM-Hepworth &Assoc.

208-736-0041

T-352 P0011/0013 F-786

turning to the question of whether Mr. Johnson's petition was, in fact, filed within

a "reasonable time," I refuted the State's arguments on this point.
21.

The Supreme Court heard an oral argument in Mr. Johnson's case. At that
argument, Justice Eismann questioned me at some length concerning the
question of whether my Pizzuto-related argument was adequately raised in the
original Appellant's Brief and, thus, properly before the Court. I conceded (as I
had in the briefing) that the Pizzuto case had not been cited in the opening brief,

but attempted to argue that the Pizzuto-related argument was nevertheless
properly considered because it was nothing more than an attempt to define the
"reasonable time" standard, which undoubtedly had been argued In the original
Appellant's Brief. Justice Eismann, however, had no patience for my argument in
this regard, as he repeatedly cut off my attempted explanation, and at least once
accused me of "lying" to the Court. After the argument, Justice Eismann refused
to shake my hand, as is customary for the Court and, instead, again accused me
of having lied to the Court.

22.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court entered an Order Dismissing Appellant's Petition
for Review. The Court ruled that review had been improvidently granted because
"the issue this Court initially wanted to address on review was

not

raised in

Appellant's opening brief on review [sic] •.• ." (emphasis in original). The only
logic~I inference is that the Court was referring to the question of whether the
rationale of Pizzuto should be applied non-capital cases, such that a "reasonable
time" for filing a successive post-conviction petition in a non-capital case should
be deemed to be one year from discovery of the facts underlying the claim(s)
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presented therein, and it meant to say that the issue was not properly before the
Court because it was not raised in Mr. Johnson's original Appellant's Brief.
23.

Looking back at Mr. Johnson's appeal now, I disagree with the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the argument presented to the Supreme Court was not properly

raised before the Court of Appeals.

I believe that the argument concerning

Pizzuto. because it was an attempt to define the 11reasonable time" standard, was
fairly encompassed within the argument made in Mr. Johnson's very first briefthat his successive petition was flied within a "reasonable time." Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, and it has concluded that the
potentially meritorious argument concerning Pizzuto was not raised in the
opening brief, as it should have been.
24.

Had I presented the Piztuto argument in Mr. Johnson's opening brief on appeal,
presumably the Supreme Court would not have dismissed the petition for review
and, instead, would have reached the merits of the Pizzuto argument.

25.

As the Pizzuto argument was a meritorious one, which may have ultimately been

adopted, and as the petition and it supporting materials raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the State wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence,
there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would have tumed out differently
had I explicitly raised the Pizzuto argument in the opening brief on appeal.
Dated this 1•t day of July, 2013.
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)
:ss
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1st day of July, 2013.

c=·-=- --~
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR ID
Residing in Boise, Idaho
Commission Expires 2112/2016
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- fJISTRtCT COURT
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FILED

2Ul3 JUL -3 PM 2: 50

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Fall~, ID 83303-1233

CiJU/H f CLERK

IY:OttL.
iEPUTY

Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcRae@MagicValleyLegal.com

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING

ROBERT JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

vs.

)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT
RICHARD JONES

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

STATE OF IDAHO

Case No. CV-2013-0000084

)

)ss.
County of Ada

)

ROBERT RICHARD JONES. being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am of sound mind to make this affidavit.

2.

I am presently an inmate in the Idaho Correctional Center, and I have been an

inmate under the supervision Idaho Department of Corrections since my sentencing in Canyon
County Case No. CR-1989-13922-C on June 24, 1991.
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3.

While in the prison system, I have been employed in different positions.

4.

From about or around 1991 through 1998, I was employed as an "Inmate Law

Clerk" ("ILC") in the prison system at both the Idaho Maximum Security Institution ("IMSI'')
(from about or around 1991 through 1995) and the Idaho State Correctional Institute ("ISCI")
(from about or around 1995 through 1998).
5.

For example, attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of my case

load sheet in 1995 to 1996 as I worked as an ILC at that time.
6.

I am well aware of the practices and procedures of the ILCs in IMSI and !SCI

during the periods in which I served as an ILC.

7.

While employed as an ILC. I, as well as other ILCs, would meet with inmates that

· had legal inquiries. including but not limited to post-conviction inquiries.

8.

When I or another ILC met with an inmate, we would determine whether or not

we could assist the inmate.

9.

If I or another ILC determined that we could assist the inmate, we would either

provide advice to the inmate, or we would draft the required legal documents for the inmate.
10.

If I or another ILC determined that we would draft the required legal documents

for an inmate, it was often the normal practice that the irunate had very little involvement in the
process and relied on our knowledge as ILCs to prepare the legal documents.
11.

I am aware now that sometime in the late 1990's, the Idaho Department of

Corrections quit employing inmates as lCCs.
12.

To my knowledge, in 2009, the Idaho Correctional Center no longer employed

inmates as ILCs.
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DATED this Zltt<of June, 2013.

Q..Qu~
Robert Richard Jones

.+-~

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this '2,1 day of June, 2013.

h

i

JAMI!$ G. QUmM
NOTARY PUBl.f¢
~"""'STA.,;.Tl:..;;·OF.,..l,._D~.........

~l&~
N0TA.RYPUBLiy/0R IDAHO
Residing at: IV/ P-- / ,I.
Commission Expires:

'1

J0(2-& -( '3

---------------------········---··-·-····-·-------------------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING
ROBERT JOHNSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.

County of Ada

)

Case No. CV-2013-0000084

PARTIAL SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT JOHNSON

ROBERT JOHNSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states:
l.

I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am of sound mind to make this affidavit.

--------2-;---J-am-the-Petitioner-in-the-above-entitled-document:--I-make-this-affidavit-to-further---

explain the process that I went through in filing my two prior post-conviction cases.
3.

I filed my first post-conviction case on November 30, 1995 (the "First Post-

Conviction Case".)
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At
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documelltll 1hllt I bad ill Ngards ro my undedying criminal case.
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The Jnma.te lAw Clerk prepared aJI or the documelllS fur my First Post-Convicli.<Jn.

Cll!le. I did not prepare the documents whatsoever aoo relied on the u:pertise of the Inmate Law
Clerlc, who also assisted me in filing the docWllell19 ill Gooding County.
My Fir.!I Post-Conviction Case was srunmarily dismissed 011 Jlllle l 1. 1996, -which

7.

dis.missal was affumed by the ldabo CowtofAppeals in July of 1997.
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Al file time that Mr. Petermll gave me the notarized confession, he i..Cormed. me
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10.

Mr. Pereison also told me tllllt Me. Phillip Brown, !he Gooding County Proseeutoc

at 1he time of my Ulldcrtyillg criminal case, knew 11:mt I wm a victim the night that Mr. Peterson
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rommitted the murders.
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Mr. l'l::tftWfl told me that he bad 1111 llflreeotent witlt Mr. Swenson and Mr. Brown

to point tile fioger al me to save himself from ttw death peolllty mMr. Perersoo:s case.
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I wa.s 11nawai:e of any t>f die furegoi.ng infoamatioo, itlcludiog the ex:islence of a
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me advice Oil wltat 1o oo.
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As l was waitin_g 10 speal: with. 1he paralegal at ICC, I C()tltaered my aunt, Karen
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I infmmed my attorney, David Heida, Ylf:!1> teprcsented 1uc in my subsequent post-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISmctunw ~, K
IY:

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GO-:r;:O"n:D~I~""'-::--,!:--

ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-84

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS

On February 14, 2013, the Petitioner, Robert Johnson, filed his Second Successive
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Court issued its Notice of Intent to Dismiss on March
12, 2013. On March 26, 2013 the Court granted to the Petitioner an additional 30 days within
which to respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. On March 29, 2013 the.petitioner
filed his Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The Petitioner after March 29, 2013 had not
filed any additional briefs or affidavits for the courts consideration within the extension of time
granted previously by the court.
After considering the Response filed by the Petitioner, the court on April 22, 2013 then
appointed counsel for the petitioner for the limited purpose of filing a "further or additional
response, supported by admissible evidence on the issue of timeliness and legal argument as to
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why [the] Second Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should not be dismissed based
on the doctrine ofres judicata or the doctrine of 'law of the case'."
On July 3, 2013 the Petitioner's appointed counsel filed his Reply to Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, together with the Affidavits of Robert Johnson; Robert Richard Jones; and Erik R.
Lehtinen.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The court hereby incorporates the procedural and factual background as set forth in the
Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss. To summarize the history of this case, the petitioner on June
24, 1994 pied guilty to two counts of felony murder and was sentenced to fixed life on
September 21, 1994.
On November 30, 1995 the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was
summarily dismissed on June 13, 1996. The summary dismissal was affirmed on July 10, 1997.
Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, 1997 Unpublished Opinion No. 617.

On July 29, 2009 the petitioner filed a Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
based on an alleged Brad/ violation. On January 15, 2010 the court dismissed the successive
petition on its merits and on the basis that the successive petition was untimely filed. The
petitioner appealed the dismissal of his successive petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal on the basis that the petition was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals did not address
the merits of the successive petition based on the Brady violation. Robert Terry Johnson v. State
of Idaho, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 574 (August 8, 2011).

1

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)
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After issuance of the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner sought and was
granted review by the Idaho Supreme Court, however, the court dismissed the petition for review
on January 16, 2013 and the Remittitur was issued on January 16, 2013.
On February 14, 2013 the petitioner filed a second Successive Petition for PostConviction Relief. This successive petition again raises the same Brady violation that was
asserted in his 2009 successive petition for post-conviction relief. In addition the petitioner
asserts that his 2009 post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct or properly
perform discovery and in failing to properly argue and present evidence, including obtaining
affidavits as to the issue of timeliness of his petition. He also asserts that the court should have
conducted hearings on motions that he had filed in his 2009 action and that the State Appellate
Public Defender failed to properly present on appeal his issue of timeliness of his 2009
successive petition for post-conviction relief.
II.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

The Court in its Notice oflntent to Dismiss pursuant to I.R.E. 201 tookjudicial notice of
the following:
1.

Unpublished Opinion No. 617, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, dated July

10, 1997;
2.

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Summary Dismissal, entered

January 15, 2010, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, Gooding County Case No.
CV-2009-399;
3.

Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Robert Terry Johnson v. State ofIdaho (Docket

No. 37378), dated August 8, 2011;
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4.

Remittitur, (Docket No. 37378), issued January 16, 2013;

5.

Registrar of Actions (ROA) in CV-2009-399.

In addition to the above, for purposes of this decision, the court hereby takes judicial notice of
the practices, policies and procedures of the Idaho Department of Corrections as concerns and
inmates "access to courts" as set forth in:
a. Board of Correction IDAPA Rule Number 405, Policy Control No. 405.02.01.001,
adopted 8-15-1995, attached hereto as Appendix "F".
III.
SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION STANDARD

A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil proceeding, entirely distinct from the
underlying criminal action. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001). If the petition fails
to present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, and making a prima
facie case, i.e. establishing each essential element of the claim, then summary dismissal is
appropriate. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (1999); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho
813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995). While the Court is required to accept petitioner's
unrebutted allegations, it need not accept petitioner's bare or conclusory allegations. Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517,960 P.2d 738 (l998);Kingv. State, 114 Idaho 442, 757P.2d 705 (Ct. App.' 1988).
When presenting a successive petition for post-conviction relief, it is the burden of the
petitioner to establish sufficient reason as to why the ground for relief was not asserted in her
original petition; or was inadequately asserted in her original petition or that any waiver of an
asserted claim was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived. LC. § 19-4908. Therefore
the court should not consider the grounds set forth in a successive petition until the petitioner has
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established a "sufficient reason" as to why it was not raised or was inadequately raised in the
original petition.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411,420 128 P.3d 948,957 (Ct.
App. 2005) summarized the standard relative to a successive petition for post-conviction relief as
follows:
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is designed
to deal with collateral attacks upon allegedly improper convictions
and sentences, not collateral attacks upon other post-conviction
proceedings. Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337,339, 743 P.2d 990, 992
(Ct.App.1987).
Ineffective assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings is not among the permissible grounds for
filing another post-conviction relief application. Id. All grounds
for relief available to an applicant under the UPCP A must be
raised in an applicant's original, supplemental, or amended
application. LC. § 19-4908. The language of Section 19-4908
prohibits successive applications in those cases where the applicant
"knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently" waived the grounds for
relief sought in the successive application or offers no "sufficient
reason" for omitting those grounds in the original application. See
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 593, 635 P.2d 955, 957 (1981).
However, Section 19-4908 allows an applicant to raise a ground
for relief, which was addressed in a former application, if he or she
can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was
inadequately raised or presented in the initial post-conviction
action. See Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789,
793 (Ct.App.1999). An allegation that a claim was not adequately
presented in the first post-conviction action due to the ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides
sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately
presented to be presented in a subsequent application for postconviction relief. Hernandez, 133 Idaho at 798, 992 P.2d at 793.

Therefore it is the burden of the petitioner on a successive petition for post-conviction
relief to show that one of two things: (1) that her appointed counsel waived claims for relief
sought which were asserted in the original petition and the waiver was not a "knowing, voluntary

287
5 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS

and intelligent" waiver by the petitioner; or (2) the applicant must offer a "sufficient reason" for
not having asserted or for having omitted grounds for relief in her original petition.
"The statutory scheme of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is designed to deal
with challenges to allegedly improper convictions and sentences, not collateral attacks upon
other post-conviction proceedings." Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 498, 887 P.2d 39, 43 (Ct.
App. 1994).
IV.
ISSUE FOR THE COURT'S DETERMINATION

As set forth above the issue for determination is whether the unpublished opinion of the
court of appeals affirming the dismissal of the 2009 successive post-conviction petition on the
basis of timeliness is a bar to this second successive petition for post-conviction relief on the
basis of res judicata or the doctrine of law of the case.
V.
ANALYSIS

The petitioner in 2009 filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief on the basis
that he had new evidence of a Brady violation based on an affidavit of his co-defendant Thomas
Peterson. This court dismissed the successive petition based on its merits as well as ori the basis
of timeliness. This court determined that the successive petition filed in 2009 was not filed
within a reasonable time. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007). The
determination of this court as to the issue of timeliness was affirmed on appeal. (Robert Terry

Johnson v. State, Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Robert Terry Johnson v. State of Idaho, dated
August 8, 2011).
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The petitioner has filed a Second Successive Petition, which seeks post-conviction relief
on the same claim of a Brady violation as alleged in his 2009 Petition. As noted above, section
19-4908 "allows an applicant to raise a ground for relief, which was addressed in a former
application, if he or she can demonstrate sufficient reason why that ground was inadequately
raised or presented in the initial post-conviction action." Baker v. State, supra. It would appear
that the petitioner claims that his 2009 post-conviction relief counsel failed to adequately present
facts as to the issue of timeliness of his 2009 Petition, and that if such facts had been presented
his 2009 Petition would not have been dismissed as untimely. This court has not found nor has
counsel for the petitioner identified any case in this State that has addressed the issue of
counsel's failure to adequately argue or support a claim that petition for post-conviction was
filed timely as a basis for a successive petition for post- conviction relief. Clearly if the
petitioner's prior post-conviction failed to provide facts or other admissible evidence disclosed
by the petitioner to such counsel relevant to the issue of timeliness, and if such "facts" would
have established that petitioner filed his petition within a reasonable time, then the failure to
provide such evidence or facts may constitute a "sufficient reason" for this second successive
petition for post-conviction relief. On the other hand if the petitioner fails to establish such facts
in this second successive petition as to the issue of timeliness, then this successive petition would
be barred by either res judicata or the law of the case.
This court in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss has already addressed the facts presented in
support of this second successive petition and why he has failed to establish a "sufficient reason"
for this successive petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner does not allege or claim a
sufficient reason based on prior counsel's failure to argue an extension of Pizzuto v. State, 146
Idaho 720, 202 P.3d 642 (2008) to a non-capital case. The petitioner claims that there were facts
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he disclosed to prior counsel that were not provided to the court. Those facts are alleged to be
contained in the Supplemental Affidavit of Robert Johnson and the Affidavit of Robert Richard
Jones, filed with this court on July 3, 2013. These affidavits can be summarized in relevant part
as follows:
(1) According to Robert Richard Jones he has been an Idaho Department of Corrections

(IDOC) inmate since June 24, 1991. That between 1991 to 1998 he served as an
Inmate Law Clerk (ILC) at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution and /or Idaho
State Correctional Institute. That as an ICL he would meet with an inmate on matters
including post-conviction relief and would decide if they could assist an inmate and if
he could, he would either provide advice to the inmate or he would draft the required
legal documents for the inmate. He states that sometime in the late 1990's IDOC was
no longer employing ILC's.
(2) According to Robert Johnson, when he filed his 1995 petition for post-conviction
relief he relied on an ILC to prepare and file the petition. After he received the written
notarized confession from Thomas Peterson, he "did not know what to do with [the]
new information" and he "knew ... that ICC no longer employed Inmate Law Clerks"
and that "as soon as I could, I contacted the paralegal at the Idaho Correctional Center
(ICC) and inquired how to proceed with the new information ... ". The paralegal
informed him that he could not provide "advice on what to do." Prior to speaking to
the paralegai2, he contacted his aunt Karen Devine, "as soon as I could", and asked
her for help to find an attorney. His aunt provided him with the addresses' for some
attorney and he wrote letters to the attorney's "as soon as I was able". Dennis
Benjamin was the only attorney to reply to his letters and he spoke to Mr. Benjamin
by telephone "as soon as I was able". Mr. Benjamin told him he needed to file another
petition for post-conviction relief. "At my next available time, I visited the
paralegal... and requested a packet of documents for post-conviction petitions."
Further, "[I] took some time for me to request the packet, receive the packet, fill out
the information needed in the packet, request an appointment to make copies of the
2

"As I was waiting to speak with the paralegal ... I contacted my aunt, Karen Devine, as soon as I could .... "
(Affidavit, ~16)
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packet, request an appointment in ICC for notary services, and to mail out the
completed packet." Lastly the "process still took weeks to complete" because he did
not have an ILC to assist him, a lack of resources and the "constraints of my actions
in ICC."
The affidavits submitted in response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss and filed in
support of this successive petition must be considered in regards to an inmate's right of access to
the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that states are not required to provide legal
assistants or law clerks to prisoners to ensure meaningful access to courts. See Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (concluding that there is no
"freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance"). Although a state must provide its
prisoners with the necessary tools to access the courts, this access does not mean the inmate must
be provided with legal advice, a complete law library or assistance with research and brief
writing. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 354.
The mere fact that IDOC stopped employing Inmate Law Clerks in the late 1990's is not
relevant to the issue of timeliness. There can be not dispute that IDOC did and does provide a
"legal resource center" and paralegals to assist an inmate to access the courts to the extent
permitted by law. 3 In fact the "petition for post-conviction relief' as filed in 1995, 2009 and 2013
was a packet or form provided to the inmate by IDOC. Assuming that the petitioner relied on an
ILC to prepare his petition for post-conviction relief in 1995, the fact remains that the petitioner
. had to assist and provide the information to the ICL to be included in the 1995 petition. The
petitioner knew from prior experience that the avenue or procedure to challenge a judgment of
conviction was a petition for post-conviction relief, whether or not he prepared the petition in
1995, he knew or should have known that could or might be an avenue or procedure for relief.

3

See, Appendix "F"

9 - MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS

231

In the late 1990' s IDOC replaced law libraries with "legal resource centers" and ILC' s
with paralegals. The legal resource centers consist of books containing relevant statutes and rules
of procedure, including the Idaho State Code and United States Code Annotated, in addition to a
set of forms and self-help packets for inmates to fill out and submit to the courts, including
Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief. Further, whether the assistance of an ILC or paralegal was
provided by IDOC, that person was never legally authorized to provide "legal advice" and it
would have been unlawful to provide legal advice. (Board of Correction IDAP A Rule Number
405, Policy Control No. 405.02.01.001, adopted 8-15-1995, attached hereto as Appendix "F")4.
An inmate is entitled to use the assistance of a paralegal and the legal resource center for postconviction relief claims. IDOC has "Access to Courts Request Forms" that an inmate can
complete and submit to obtain the necessary post-conviction relief forms, copies, notarization
and mailing. (See, Appendix "F"). A paralegal may not engage in any activity that might be
considered as engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
The petitioner sometime prior to March 10, 2009, which he previously has said was
"early 2009", received information from Mr. Peterson that petitioner was alleged to be a victim
and not a perpetrator of the crimes he pled guilty to. The petitioner appears to have done nothing
towards preparing a post-conviction relief petition, after receipt of information in "early 2009"
and prior to receipt of the Peterson affidavit.
On March 10, 2009 the petitioner received the Peterson affidavit. 5 Mr. Johnson alleges
he " ... did not know what to do with this information or the legal procedure to use the new
information." (Johnson Supplemental Affidavit, ,r 13.). The petitioner new or should have known
4

The court hereby takes judicial notice of the findings of fact relative to !DOC inmate access to courts as found in
Meza-Sayas v. Conway, 2007 WL 260 I 086 (D. Idaho), September I 0, 2007; Bleau v. Beauclair, 2007 WL 2344926
(D. Idaho), August 14, 2007.
5
Mr. Johnson in his most recent affidavit states "Sometime in 2009, Thomas Peterson, ... handed me a notarized
confession ... ". Mr. Johnson is not specific as to the date he received the confession and yet this information should
be known to him.
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that he could use post-conviction relief as a means to challenge his conviction based on new
evidence. The ignorance of a person of his or her right to bring an action does not excuse the
petitioner from filing a successive petition within a reasonable period of time from discovery of
the alleged Brady violation. Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413, 415, 913 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Ct. App.
1996). However, the petitioner was not totally ignorant by his own admission as pointed out in
this court's notice of intent to dismiss:
The petitioner also attached an Affidavit from his aunt, Karen
Devine. According to Ms. Devine, the petitioner wrote to her on
March 11, 2009 asking for her help to find an attorney to assist him
and she attached the petitioner's letter which in part states, " .. .I
have time limits on filing so I need help quickly . ... ". Ms.
Devine received this letter near the "end of March". Ms. Devine
made contact with the Idaho State Bar in the middle of April, 2009
in an attempt to contact a lawyer for the petitioner. Ms. Devine
believes that the petitioner was in contact with an attorney Mr.
Benjamin in May, 2009." (Notice of Intent to Dismiss, pg. 11-12,
emphasis added).
The petitioner states that "as soon as [he] could [he] contacted the paralegal. .. ". (Johnson
Supplemental Affidavit,

1 14.).

This statement is nothing more than a general or conclusory

allegation. Since his contact with a paralegal requires a written request form, the date that he
requested paralegal assistance is readily available to the petitioner. The petitioner could have
requested a post-conviction relief packet and he apparently did not. Instead, the petitioner wrote
a letter to his aunt on March 11, 2009 hoping to get the assistance of an attorney, yet he had to
know that he could not pay for the advice of an attorney. The petitioner has provided no
admissible evidence or facts as to what he did between March 11, 2009 to May, 2009 to request,
prepare or file a petition for post-conviction relief, although, as he stated to his aunt, he knew
there were time limits which would suggest that he had obtained some information or knowledge
from the legal resource center or from his prior post-conviction experience.
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The petitioner alleges that sometime in May 2009 he spoke to an attorney, Mr. Benjamin
and was advised to file a petition for post-conviction relief. (Johnson Supplemental Affidavit,

,r

19.). The petitioner again is not specific as to when he requested a post-conviction relief packet
from the legal resource center, other than to state, "at my next available time" or how long it took
him to prepare it, other than to state "it took some time". (Johnson Supplemental Affidavit,

,r 20,

21.). Again the petitioner is not factually specific as to dates, while this information is readily
available to the petitioner. Such statements are as before nothing more than general allegations or
conclusions. It is apparent that the petitioner had not allegedly provided prior appointed counsel
"specific facts or admissible evidence" as to what he did or attempted to do to file a timely
successive petition. It would appear that he only provided "conclusory or general allegations".
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are inadequate to entitle a petitioner
to an evidentiary hearing. Zikovic v. State, 150 Idaho 783, 786, 251 P.3d 611, 614 (Ct. App.
2011). See also Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth

v. Gardner, I IO Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).
"To justify a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must make a
factual showing based on admissible evidence." lYfcKinney v. State, I 33 Idaho
695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999). The application must be supported by written
statements from competent witnesses or other verifiable information. Paradis v.
State, 110 Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306. 1308 (I 986) (citing Drapemt v. State,
103 Idaho 612. 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct.App.1982)). Unsubstantiated and
conclusory allegations are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary
hearing. King v. State, 114 Idaho 442. 446, 757 P.2d 705, 709 (Ct.App.1988).

Pizzuto v. State, 145 Idaho 155,160,233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010)

The petitioner could have obtained an affidavit from the paralegal he had spoken to, or
the IDOC records from the legal resource center, including but not limited to copies of his access
to courts request forms he submitted, which he has failed to do. In fact the petitioner-does not
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ever attest to the fact that he ever submitted any "Access to Court Request Forms''. The
petitioner has had since January 15, 2010 to obtain additional information and facts from IDOC
to establish the timeliness of his successive petitions for post-conviction relief and yet as of this
date and with the assistance of counsel has failed to do so.
The petitioner has previously admitted that he knew "in early 2009" of the alleged
exculpatory evidence concerning Peterson. (Johnson Affidavit, dated December 3, 2009,

,r 6.).

The petitioner received the written confession from Peterson on or about March 10, 2009 and on
March 11, 2009 he wrote a letter to his aunt to ask that she assist him in finding a lawyer.
(Affidavit of Karen L. Devine, dated May 3, 2011 ). It is not reasonable for the petitioner to
believe he could hire an attorney on his own and yet he knew or should have known that he
could have requested appointment of counsel at the time of filing a post-conviction relief
petition, from his prior experience. The petitioner had prior knowledge of post-conviction relief
proceedings. The petitioner on or before March 11, 2009 the petitioner knew there were times
limits for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner prior to May, 2009 claims to
have had contact with an IDOC paralegal, yet he never requested a post-conviction relief packet
and forms from the "legal resource center". In May 2009 the petitioner spoke to an attorney,
Dennis Benjamin, who told petitioner that he needed to file a petition for post-conviction relief,
which he knew or should have known in March 2009. The petitioner has not identified the date
or the month that he requested a post-conviction relief packet from the "legal resource center".
The petitioner has not identified the date or month that he received the post-conviction relief
packet or how long it took him to complete the petition for filing. The 2009 successive petition
was mailed to the district court for filing on July 27, 2009 and was filed on July 29, 2009.
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This court previously determined that four (4) months to file a successive petition for
post-conviction relief was unreasonable under the circumstances and therefore untimely. This
determination was affirmed on appeal. (Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Robert Terry Johnson v.
State of Idaho, dated August 8, 2011 )6. The petitioner has failed to establish a factually

"sufficient reason" on the part of his prior appointed post-conviction relief counsel, as to justify
this second successive petition. Further, the conduct of appellate counsel on post-conviction
appeals is not grounds for relief. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 497-498, 887 P.2d 39, 42-43
(Ct. App. 1994). Further, even if appellate counsel had properly raised on appeal the extension of
Pizutto 7 for purposes of the petition for review, it is pure speculation that the Idaho Supreme

Court would have extended the reasoning in Pizutto to noncapital cases. However, in Pizutto, the
court held that in a capital case forty-two (42) days from the date the petitioner knew or should
have known of the claim, is a reasonable time to file a successive petition for post-conviction
relief and that beyond that time the petitioner would have to show "extraordinary circumstances
that prevented [him] from filing the claim" within the forty-two day period. Also see, Dunlap v.
State, 131 Idaho 576, 961 P.2d 1179 (1998). The decision in Pizzuto was decided a little over a

year before the petitioner herein discovered the alleged Brady violation. If forty-two days is a
reasonable time to file a successive petition in a capital case there is no reason to believe that
such a time period would not be reasonable in a non-capital case. In fact, the petitioner herein
was able to file this second successive petition within twenty-nine (29) days of the issuance of
the Remittitur by the Supreme Court as to his 2009 successive petition.
The petitioner's 2009 successive petition was adjudged by this court to be untimely in
that it was not filed within a reasonable time after discovery of the confession of his co-

6

i

The Court of Appeals declined to extend the Pizzuto decision to noncapital cases.
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,202 P.3d 642 (2008)
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defendant and the decision of this court was affirmed on appeal. Under the "law of the case
doctrine" our courts will not revisit issues that have previously been decided by an appellate
court. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001); State v. Creech, 132 Idaho
1, 9,966 P.2d 1, 9 (1998). Further, in post-conviction proceedings, our courts have "applied the
related principles of res judicata to bar an attempt to raise, in an application for post-conviction
relief, the same issue previously decided in a direct appeal." Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 798,
291 P.3d 474, 481 (Ct. App. 2012). The second successive petition for post-conviction relief is
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and the "law of the case". The petitioner's successive
petition for post-conviction relief based on an alleged Brady violation was untimely asserted in
his 2009 successive petition and remains untimely to this date.
VI.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above and as set forth in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss,
the petitioner's second successive petition for post-conviction relief is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

31

day of

~ l::(

'

, 2013
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~

I, undersigned, hereby certify that on the 3 / day of
, 2013 a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISI~OTICE OF INTENT TO
DISMISS was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons:
Robert Terry Johnson
IDOC # 27073
ICC-I219B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83 707

Gooding County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 86
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Steven R. McRae
McRae Law Office, PLLC
161 5th Ave. South, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303
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GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
1. Qualified Legal Claims
The IDOC has identified the following legal claims and legal claim packets in which
paralegal staff will assist offenders.
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Note: If an offender is in need of assistance other than what is identified as qualified legal
claims as set forth in this SOP, then the request for assistance should be sent via an
Offender Concern Form (see SOP 316.02 .01 .001 , Grievance and Informal Resolution
Procedures for Offenders) to the Division of Prison's access to courts coordinator for
consideration .
State Court
The Access to Courts Manual contains the following legal claim packets that are
appropriate for filing in state court:
•

Rule 35. (Correction or reduction of sentence)

•

UPCPA. (Uniform Post-conviction Procedure Act)

•

•
•

•
•

Probation revocatio

•

Modification of Ida

•
•
•
•
•

Medical malpractic

order.

Tort claim .
Credit for time served .
Power of attorney .
Miscellaneous forms .

Federal Court
The Access to Courts Manual contains the following legal clai
appropriate for filing in federal court:
•

Federal civil rights.

•

Federal habeas corpus.

•

9 th Circuit appeal appeals.

•

Writ of Certiorari appeals.

tare
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2. P rocess to Request Access to Courts Assistance, Services, and Resources

Access to Courts Request Process
Functional Roles and
Res onsibilities

.· Ste

Tasks
•

Offender

1

Paralegal Staff

Paralegal Staff

Paralegal Staff

4

Paralegal Staff

5

Paralegal Staff

6

Paralegal Staff

7

Paralegal Staff

Request paralegal assistance, services, and
resources using the applicable Access to Courts
Request Form ; and

• Place the si ned form in the desi nated lock box.
Note: If in need of the form , see a paralegal ( or other
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is
SOP). The form comes in English and Spanish.
Gather the access to courts request forms each business
da .
Send the requested resources (e.g., a form or qualified
legal claim packet) to the offender using institutional mail
(see SOP 402.02 .01 .001, Mail Handling in Correctional
F ·
r schedule a visit w ith the offender at the
ter or other location.
rovide the offender with the list of qualified
kets see section 1 from which to choose.

the Daily Book Check-out
Courts database .
If the offender requests assistance, h Ip the offender
com lete authorized court fili n s.
Note: If the offender has a physical
prepare or write the materials or do
assistance, see section 8 of this S
If the offender is illiterate in the

8

•

Arrange for an IDOC sta member, who speaks the
offender's native language, to interpret; or

•

Arrange for another offender, who speaks the
offender's native language, to interpret; or

•

Offender

9

Access the Language Line Services to provide
interpretation.
Com lete the claim for filin with the court.
Note: To complete th is process, also see section 4 of this
SOP .

3. Authorized Photocopies
A uthorized photocopies include:
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•

Documents and all attachments allowed pursuant to this SOP that are ready to be
filed with the court and opposing counsel, as requi red.

•

A completed Power of Attorney signed by the offender and notarized , if needed.

Note: If there is a question regarding the documents or attachments, paralegal staff will
determine what documents are necessary based on court rules or by contacting the court.
Class Action and Multiple Offender Legal Actions
When offenders jointly file documents and attachments with the court as co-plaintiffs
(parties to the legal action) photocopies shall not be made for all parties to the legal
action because a full photocopy must be maintained in the Resource Center. However,
the offender who filed the legal action with the court will have the option of paying for
one additional full hotocopy, which must be maintained as his personal copy. Upon
request, all otaalil- to the legal action will be allowed to review the photocopy
maintained ·
e Center.

previous
record of th
action is transferred to another facility, then a
If an offender who is a party t
full photocopy of the initial fl
quent filings can be made for that offender at
his own expense. Howev
meets the requirements to be considered
indigent as defined in SO --==:-=--=--=:t•' Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities , a full
photocopy can be made f
upon his request at no expense to the offender.
4. Mailing and Photocopying Court Documents a
Photocopying privileges for offenders include th

ditions:

•

Offenders (excluding indigent offend
page for copies.

•

Offenders (excluding indigent offenders) should use their ow nvelopes for court
filings; however, by necessity to meet a court filing deadline envelopes are
·
enders) will
obtained through the Resource Center, offenders (excludin
be charged the equivalent commissary price.

•

Page limitations on pleadings may be enforced in ace

d a fee of ten cents ($.10) per

Note: Mail sent to the Idaho Judicial Council , Idaho State Bar, or courts is not (by definition)
legal ma il and is therefore subject to search. However, paralegal staff shall still log mail sent
to these entities on the Outgoing Legal Mail Log (located in the Access to Courts database).
Procedure for Filing Pleadings and Other Documents with a Court

Functional Roles and '
Responsibilities
Offender

Step

1

Tasks·,
Complete the documents, forms, or pleadings to be
photocopied and mailed.
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Tasks
Submit to the paralegal staff the applicable Access to
Courts Request Form for copies, notary (if needed), and
mailin services.
Note: If in need of the form , see a paralegal (or other
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is
SOP). The form comes in English and Spanish.

•
Paralegal Staff

3

Page Number:
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•

Meet with the offender; and

•

Paralegal Staff

Determine those documents authorized for
hotoco in in accordance with this SOP.
Notarize the documents that require a notary (if needed) .

Paralegal Staff

Photocopy the documents as required by court rules.
Within two (2) business days of completing the request:
•

Complete an Offender Personal Funds Withdrawal
Slip: and

Paralegal Staff

Paralegal Staff

7

Paralegal Staff

8

mail to the mailroom for

5. Service of Documents Upon Opposing Parties
Note: Service of a Summons and Complaint via mail does not con
a state of Idaho court matter.

te effective service in

Service on the /DOC, Idaho Board of Correction, Idaho Co
Parole, or Any Employee Thereof
An offender shall neither attempt, nor cause another offender acting on his behalf to
attempt to personally serve the IDOC, the Idaho Board of Correction, the Idaho
Commission of Pardons and Parole, or any employee thereof, with any legal documents.
Service on the IDOC, the Idaho Board of Correction, the Idaho Commission of Pardons
and Parole, or any employee thereof, by an offender or member of the general public,
shall be made by personal service upon a deputy attorneys general (DAG) who
represents the I DOC. Service on any other person or entity shall be the sole
responsibility of the offender.
Note: Any service upon a DAG must (a) be in accordance with applicable court rules
and (b) take place at Central Office. (See Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure [IRCPJ, rules 4
[d] 2 and 4 [d] 5; Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 4; and Idaho Administrative
-.--·· ···-···--·--- ·-----Procedure Act [IDAPA] 06.01 .01 , section 106.)
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•

Service on an Offender
In General

When an offender is served with a summons and complaint that is not a qualified legal
claim (as described in section 1) and which requires a response per IRCP or Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the offender shall be provided the opportunity to file a
response. Paralegal staff shall provide mailing and photocopying services (see section
1) that are consistent with court filing requirements .

I Note:

Paralegal assistance (see section 11) shall be limited to the initial response only.

By an Outside Process Server
Occasionally, an offender may be served with court documents regarding a civil action
filed against the
der. Federal and state of Idaho court rules provide for service to be
conducted b
process server who is 18 years of age or older and not a party
to the cas
recess server does not have to be law enforcement personnel
If a victim
IDOC victim
Note: Due to significant sec
into a facility to serve doc
describe service of proce
to courts coordinator shou
development of the field m

s about letting an outside process server come
ility shall develop a field memorandum to
t that facility. The Division of Prison's access
to provide guidance to facility staff in the

6. Access to Court Supplies for Indigent Offend
Indigent status is defined in SOP 402.02.01 .0
in Correctional Facilities. If
an offender does not meet the requirements
defin
considered indigent, the
paralegal (or other facility head-designated staff membe er section 15) shall ensure the
offender has the ability to access the courts in accordance with this
P. This may include
providing the offender with indigent supplies, photocopying docume
for the offender, or
providing postage , if necessary. For example, if an offender has on
ollar a d twenty cents
($1.20) in his Offender Trust Account and needs to make 30 photo
·
otiof! and
mail it to the court to be filed , the paralegal (or other facility hea
signated staff member
per section 15) shall accommodate the request even though t
ffender does not have
enough money in his account to cover the fu ll expense of photocopying and mailing the
motion.

Indigent supplies include the following :
•

Blank paper for preparing court filings (no more than 25 sheets in an offender's
possession at any time).
Note: Indigent offenders should use preprinted forms if available. The blank sheets
of paper must have the facility name and the terms 'indigent legal paper' printed in
the bottom left corner of at least one side of the paper to identify it as paper that has
been authorized for legal work.

•

Envelopes for mailing at the time of filing or to a verifiable attorney of record.

•

One security pen (black ink only) on an exchange basis.

l
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Note: The sufficient amount of postage required to mail authorized legal documents for filing
shall be affixed to the envelope (see SOP 402.02.01 .001, Mail Handling in Correctional
Facilities).

Procedure to Obtain Indigent Supplies
Functional Roles and
Res onsibilities

Offender

Ste

1

Paralegal Staff

Paralegal Staff
Paralegal Staff

Tasks
Request indigent supplies using the applicable Access to
Courts Re uest Form.
Note: If in need of the form, see a paralegal (or other
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is
SOP). The form comes in English and Spanish.
Determine what indigent supplies are needed .

By individual items, enter the indigent supplies in the
Resource Center Indigent Offender Supplies Log and
Access to Courts database.
Issue the indigent supplies to the offender.

Note: If the offender is misusin
head (or designee) may limit
issued.

e indigent supplies issued to him, the facility
igent supplies the offender has on hand or is

7. Offenders Who are Unable to

e Forms
An offender who believes he needs help completi

legal claim forms may:

•

In accordance with SOP 402.02.01 .00 .
directive 503.02 .01 .001, Offender 7i
one
contact an attorney and seek representation at

•

Complete a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment

•

Request assistance from paralegal staff (see section 2 andl

in Correctional Facilities, and
ng and Recording, directly
offender'

8. Offender-to-Offender Assistance

Offenders may assist one another with legal work under the following guidelines:
•

Both offenders must live in the same housing unit and have access to one another
during normal facility operations.

•

The assisting offender cannot (a) work on the legal material alone, (b) be in
possession of the other offender's legal materials, or (c) prepare or write the other
offender's materials and documents unless the offender is unable to prepare or write
them due to being illiterate in the English language or due to a physical disability.

•

An offender shall not receive any item or service for helping another offender with
legal work.

•

An offender shall not represent another person in any legal proceeding.
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Obtaining, Completing, and Processing Affidavits
When affidavits are complete, the affidavits and copies of attachments becomes the
property of the offender filing the claim. (The attachments that have the original
signature will be returned to the offender providing the affidavit.)

When necessary, due to custody level ; housing; or facility, paralegal staff will help
offenders wit
ss of obtaining affidavits. To eliminate questions regarding the
affidavit pro
wing information must be obtained before the process begins:
ress of the offender filing the document;

•

Th

•

Th

•

The na

•

The case number if

urt in which the case is pending or will be filed;
ting to the information in the affidavit; and

After the information not
ed, the affidavit can be given to the offender
attesting to the informatio
ttesting to the information can write the
affidavit or sign the docum
· the
der filing the document wrote the information. If
the offender attesting to the affliilliiiiHs in another
· ity, the paralegal staff will facilitate
the process.

9. Right to Retain Counsel
This SOP is not intended to interfere with an offender's
10. Supervision of Paralegal Staff
f paralegal
The facility head will designate a deputy warden to provide direct s
eputy ward'en. The
staff. Paralegal staff will address operational issues with the desi
paralegal or deputy warden may contact the Division of Prisa ' ccess to courts
coordinator regarding operational issues.

The chief of the Division of Prisons (or designee) will designate a division access to courts
coordinator.
The Division of Prison's access to courts coordinator will report directly to the chief of the
Division of Prisons (or designee) and be responsible for the following:
•

Responding to any request that is not authorized pursuant to this SOP (also see the
note box in section 1);

•

Scheduling and coordinating paralegal meetings;

•

Identifying training needs and agenda items for the meeting;

•

Facilitating the meeting;

•
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•

Providing guidance to paralegal staff, facility staff, and IDOC administration
regarding access to courts issues;

•

Requesting clarification from the DAG's Office (who represents the IDOC) regarding
access to courts issues;

•

Requesting clarification of policy and SOP issues from the !DOC policy coordinator
or Division of Prison's policy coordinator, as applicable (both coordinators are
located at Central Office); and

•

Maintaining and issuing the password to the password protected Access to Courts
Manual only to those deemed as having a need to know, such as paralegals and
attorneys .

11. Duties of Parale
The IDOC shal
Paralegal duti ·

gal staff to assist offenders with qualified legal claims.
!lowing:

•
•

••1ers with IDOC-authorized legal resources.

•

Providing offenders with

•

Providing notary servi

•

Providing or securing
offenders seeking assi

•

Maintaining the following logs and forms in t

es for non-English speaking and special needs
tial pleadings for qualified legal claims.

•

Daily Book Check-out Log (Locat

s to Courts database.)

•

Individual Activity Log (Locate

Courts database.)

•

Notary Services Log (Note: Notary logs are the prope

of the notaries.)

•

Outgoing Legal Mail Log (Located in the Access to C

s database.)

•

Resource Center Attorney Telephone Call Request F

•

Resource Center Copies Log

•

Resource Center Indigent Offender Supplies Log

•

Resource Center Request to Store Excess Legal Materials Form

A paralegal will not:
•

Assist offenders to file any claim that is beyond the scope of this SOP.

•

Offer legal advice. (Note: Assistance with grammar, spelling, or other matters not of
a legal consequence shall not be considered offering legal advice.)

•

Represent an offender.

•

Refer offenders to attorneys or attorneys to offenders.

•

Make unauthorized changes to Access to Courts Manual forms or packets.

•

Schedule appointments for offenders to meet with each other.

'-
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Issue the password to the password protected Access to Courts Manual to any other
persons _

12.LegalResources
As described in table 15-1, Resource Centers will maintain the publications, forms, and
packets listed in the Access to Courts Manual and make them available to the facilities they
service.
Facility staff may not purchase additional items or create additional forms without the written
approval of the director of IDOC (or designee).
Resources may be used in the Resource Center or checked out as approved by paralegal
staff.
The IDOC does n
additional rese
received throu
Correctional

for extensive or generalized legal research . If an offender wants
not available in the Resource Center, the materials may be
cordance with SOP 402.02 .01 .001, Mail Handling in

Functional Roles-and
Res onsibilities
Facility Head

1

Offender

2

Paralegal Staff

3

Paralegal Staff

4

Paralegal Staff (or
Desi nee

5

Paralegal Staff

6

Offender

7

hotocopy of the court order or
urs prior to the telephone

de available at the

Log the call using the Individual
Access to Courts database .
Participate in the telephone hearing.

Note: If the offender fails to provide 24 hour notice to the !DOC, a paralegal staff will still
facilitate the call , if possible.

Table 13-2: Attorney Telephone Calls
Offenders can place unmonitored telephone calls to their attorneys using the offender
telephone system (see directive 503.02 .01 .001, Offender Telephone Monitoring and
Recording). If an offender is unable to place a direct telephone call to his attorney using
the offender telephone system , the offender may then (a) contact the attorney via mail
(in accordance with SOP 402.02.0 1.001, Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities) and
request that the attorney place a telephone call to facility paralegal staff and askthem-to -
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arrange a telephone call from the offender to the attorney or (b) simply just correspond
with the attorney via mail.
Occasionally an attorney may have difficulty making contact with an offender because of
schedule conflicts or due to the offender's inability to access the telephone at a specific
time. If an attorney or attorney's agent contacts the paralegal requesting to talk to an
offender, and the paralegal determines the normal process outlined in directive
503.02.01.001 , Offender Telephone Monitoring and Recording, will not work, the
paralegal will use the following process steps:
· Functional Roles and
Res onsibilities
Attorney (or
Attorney's Agent)
Paralegal Staff

Paralegal Staff
Offender

Tasks

Contact the paralegal staff; and
Re uest an attorne tele hone call with the offender.
Log the request using the Individual Activity Log (located in
the Access to Courts database.
Prepare a Resource Center Attorney Telephone Call
Request Form to forward to the offender with the name of
the attorney, the telephone number to call, and the date
·
e attorne tele hone call is to be laced.
rney telephone call.

14. Forms for Qualified Legal C

Authorized forms for qualified I
a=m~ e maintained in the Access to Courts Manual.
Only paralegal staff and designe
access tot
nual (see section 10 for further
details). The Access to Courts Manual table of co
the authorized materials.
Prohibited Forms

Offenders must not draft or possess the

lowing.

•

Completed or blank transport orders; and

•

Blank letterhead stationery (of any kind).

15. Access to Courts Procedures for Facilities without a Resou
Offenders housed at St. Anthony Work Camp (SAWC), North '
o Correctional Institution
(NICI), South Boise Women's Correctional Center (SBWCC), or a CWC will use the
appropriate Resource Center listed in table15-1 to provide offenders access to court
services. The Division of Prison's access to courts coordinator may also be contacted to
provide services. The facility head (or designee) will designate a facility staff member to help
offenders with general, day-to-day operational issues regarding access to courts matters.
The Division of Prison 's access to courts coordinator can make temporary (up to 60 days)
reassignments of this reporting structure to accommodate training or staff shortages. The
assigned paralegal staff member at the facility that has a Resource Center shall visit (as
needed, but at least once a month) the facility served that does not have a Resource Center
(see the following table).
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Table 15-1: Resource Centers
Facili

Resource .Center
Idaho Correctional Institution Orofino (ICIO)

South Idaho Correctional Institution (SICI)

Pocatello Women's C
(PWCC)

Table 15-2:
Center

Served ·. •

•

ICIO

•
•

NICI
East Boise ewe

•

Nampa ewe

•

SBWeC

•

SICI

•
•

sIeI ewe
Idaho Falls ewe

•

PWCe

•

SAWe

or Offenders Housed at Facilities without a Resource

.Fllnctiori~t.Rol~ an
.. Res . onsibilities//

Offender

1

Facility Head (or
Designee)

2

•
Paralegal

3

•
•

Facility Head (or
Designee)

4

which services or
(located in
Ensure the offender recei
resources ; and

•

Document in the Corrections Integrated System
(CIS), using the contact sheets, when the offender
receives the services or resources.
For further assistance with CIS, see your designated CIS super user.

16. Storage of Excess Legal Materials
Each facility head will identify a secure area for storing an offender's

excess legal materials.

The IDOC will store legal materials related to active and ongoing litigation that cannot be
contained in an offender's authorized personal property. The amount of storage space
needed will be taken into consideration when storing an offender's legal materials that are
·
referenced in the offender's active and ongoing litigation.

C
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•

The IDOC will not store case law that is not specifically and directly related to an active and
ongoing case, excess legal materials, multiple copies of pleadings, research materials, or
materials not directly related to the offender's active and ongoing litigation.
Legal materials remaining after the offender has been released will be disposed of in
accordance with SOP 320 .02.01 .001, Property: State-issued and Offender Personal
Property. If the offender has paroled, any legal material he left at the facility shall be
forwarded to the offender's new address and documented in the Corrections Integrated
System (CIS) in accordance with SOP 320.02.01 .001.
On an annual basis, paralegal staff (with the offender present) will review stored excess
legal materials. If the offender cannot be present, paralegal staff will document the reason
why using the Individual Activity Log (located in the Access to Courts database.
Note: Each facility shall develop a field memorandum to describe the process for offenders
cess legal materials, and a process to inventory the material.
to store and retri
s to courts coordinator should be contacted to provide
The Division of
guidance to f
development of the field memorandum.

Process Step
For the purpo51!111...,rnis SOP onl
Center or another part of th
unauthorized staff do not h

Offender

Housing Unit Staff

'

ure storage' shall mean an area in a Resource
at can be locked, and (b) where offenders and

taff for verification.
e a paralegal (or other
membe per section 15 of this

1

•

Verify that the legal materials a in excess of the
apers and
allowable three (3) cubic feet o
.01 .001,
legal materials allowable per
ender Personal
Property: State-issued an
Property; and

•

Complete the submitted Resource Center Request to
Store Excess Legal Materials Form and return it to the
offender.

2
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•

6

Tasks.
Submit the completed Resource Center Request to Store
Excess Legal Materials Form to paralegal staff (or other
facility head-designated staff member per section 15 of th is
SOP .
Note: If there are no case numbers , titles , court
information , or required signatures on the form , paralegal
staff (or the facility head-designated staff member) will
return the form to you and the process will end here.
Note: If needed, the paralegal staff (or facility headdesignated staff member) will provide you with a box to
store your excess legal materials. However, if you want to
organize your excess legal materials when storing them, it
shall be your responsibility to purchase organizing
materials (e.g., file folders and manila envelopes) from the
commissary and organize your excess legal materials prior
to storing them.
Ve ·
numbers , titles, court information, and whether
atures are provided .
rmation is not submitted - return the form
er and end the process here until the
information is submitted; or

to

information · ubmitted roceed to ste 5.
bring the excess legal
Inform the offender
materials to the
,.=...=.:...,ae_lo_c_a_tio_n_._ _ _ _ _ _ _--i
Note: If need
ender with a box to store his
excess lega
teria
offender wants to organize his
excess legal materials be ore storing em , it shall be the
offender's responsibility to purchase ganizing materials
(e.g., file folders and manila envelo
) from the
commissary and organize his exce legal
terials prior
to being allowed to store them.
In accordance with section 20
320.02.0 1.001 , Property: Stat
Personal Property:
•

Search the excess legal material for unauthorized
items; and

•

Dispose of the unauthorized items in accordance with
SOP 320 .02 .0 1.001.
Clearly mark and identify each file folder or manila
envelope with numbers and letters. (E.g ., Box 2, File 3.)

Offender
Paralegal Staff (or
Designee)
and
Offender
Paralegal Staff (or
Desi nee

7

8

Create an inventory sheet for documenting and tracking.the- .
excess le al materials.
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17. Record Retention
Paralegal staff will retain copies of access to court forms, attachments, and other logs and
documentation identified in this SOP as follows : five (5) years for paper and seven (7) for
electronic records.
18. Attorney Visits
Attorney visits are explained in SOP 604.02.01 .001, Visiting.
19. Confidential Mail
All indigent confidential mail shall be processed in accordance with SOP 402.02 .01 .001,
Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities.
20. Searching Legal Material
rch of offenders' legal material can be found in SOP
I/Living Unit, and Offender.

REFERENCES
Directive 503.0
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Unlawful Practice of Law - Penalty
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IR
Governmental Subdivisions

,

ule 4 (d) (5 ·

ice Upon State, Agencies or

IDAPA 06.01 .01, Rules of the Board of Corre
Department Employees

, Service of Process on

Language Line Services (www.languageline.com)
Offender Personal Funds Withdrawal Slip
Standard Operating Procedure 316.02.01 .001, Grievance and Info
Procedures for Offenders

ion

Standard Operating Procedure 317.02 .01.001 , Searches: Ce/
Standard Operating Procedure 320.02.01 .001, Property: State-issued and Offender
Personal Property
Standard Operating Procedure 402.02.01 .001, Mail Handling in Correctional Facilities
Standard Operating Procedure 604.02.01 .001, Visiting
State of Idaho, Idaho Judicial Council (www.judicialcouncil.idaho.gov)
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United States Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (www ,irs,gov)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL D I S ~ ~ ~ - K - ~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING

ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO ,
Respondent.

______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2013-84

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

The court having entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and after having received and
considered the Petitioner's Response, the court entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of
Intent to Dismiss,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Petitioner's Second
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DA TED this ~~--_

day of ,--:;:

l - JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

L'{

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

~

l, undersigned, hereby certify that on the .,:5 I day of
, 2013 a true and
correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT OF DISMISSALas mailed, postage paid, and/or
hand-delivered to the following persons:
Robert Terry Johnson
IDOC # 27073
ICC- I 219 B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

Gooding County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 86
Gooding, Idaho 83330

Steven R. McRae
McRae Law Office, PLLC
161 5th Ave. South, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303

Dittf=

2 - JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

08-14-'13 11:13 FROM-Hepworth &Assoc.

208-736-0041

T-470 P0002/0006 F
~ISTRlC l CQURT
ING CO 19MiQ

lit,

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcRae@MagicValleyLegal.com

-11,c,.C,U
'"

Il: I

2013

JUUEGOLL

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING
ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Respondent.

Case No. CV-2013-84

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND REQUEST FOR OPPORTUNITY
TO RESPOND LR.C.P. 11(a)(2), I.e. §
19-4906(b)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Robert Johnson, by and through his attorney of record, Steven

R McRae of McRae Law Office. PLLC, and files this Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2) and Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). Specifically, Petitioner asks for twenty (20)
days to respond to new factual assertions, analysis and legal conclusions as contained in the

Court>s Memorandum Decision re: Notice of Intent to Dismiss as filed on March 12, 2013 (the

..Memorandum Decision") that were not contained in the Notice ofIntent to Dismiss filed on July
31, 2013. Oral Argument is requested on this matter.
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ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), a Court can, by its own volition. dismiss a postconviction petition.

However, in order to do so, the Court must grant the post~conviction

petitioner "an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal." Id.
In Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App. 1982). the Idaho Court of
Appeals further considered the application of Idaho Code § I 9-4906(b). In Gibbs, Gibbs filed a
petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 759, 653 P.2d at 814 (Ct. App. 1982). The State moved
to dismiss the petition on the sole ground that it was not timely filed under Idaho Code § 194902. Id. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss; however. the Court based its
decision not on the question for timeliness, but on the merits of Gibbs' application. Id. The
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the dismissal by the District Court was inappropriate. as the
petitioner was not given the requisite.twenty (20) days' notice as required by Idaho Code § 19~
4906(b). Id. at 760, 653 P.2d at 815 (Ct. App. 1982). The Court held, ..For Gibbs to have had a

chance to argue the point which detennined

the

outcome of the case, it was necessary for the

district court to comply with the notice requirement.

Tlie obvious purpose of the notice

requirement of LC. § 19-4906{b) is to ensure that a petitioner will have the opportuni'ty to
challenge an adverse decision before it becomes fmaJ:· Id. (Emphasis added).
In the present matter, Petitioner is asking for a twenty (20) day period so as to answer
newly asserted factual allegations and legal grounds as contained in the Memorandum Decision
to dismiss Petitioner's Petition and Affidavit for 2nd Successive Post-Conviction Relief.
Specificallyt Petitioner requests the opportunity to research and respond to the following:

a.

The Court states that petitioner's factual allegations are "bare and conclusory".

See Memorandum Decision at 11-12. Petitioner seeks the opportunity to research respond to this
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legal reasoning and conclusion, which was not contained in the Court's Notice of Intent to

Dismiss.
b.

The Court states, "The ignorance of a person of his or her right to bring an action

does not excuse the petitioner from filing a successive petition within a reasonable period of time
from discovery of the alleged Brady violation." Memorandum Decision at 11. Petitioner seeks
the opportunity to research and respond to this legal conclusion, which was not contained in the
Court's Notice ofIntent to Dismiss.
c.

The Court references IDAPA No. 405. Policy Control No. 405.02.01.001 and

draws several inferences from the same. See Memorandum Decision at 9ul3. Petitioner seeks
the opportunity to research and respond to the inferences and conclusions as have been drawn. by
the Court from the IDAP A in arguing that he filed his original post-conviction petition within a
''reasonable time''. as the Court's inferences, analysis and conclusions were not contained in the

Court's Notice ofIntent to Dismiss.
d.

The Court makes other inferences based upon the factual record (not based upon

the above-cited IDAPA). See Memorandum Decision at 11 (that because Petitioner stated that he
has time limits, that he must have ••obtained some information or knowledge from the legal
resource center or from his prior post-conviction experience") and (that Petitioner ''had to know
that he could not pay for the advice of an attorney"); and at 13 (that "[i]t is not reasonable for the
petition to believe he could hire an attorney on his own ... "). (that "he knew or should have
known that he could have requested appointment of counsel at the time of filing a postconviction relief petition, [sic] from his prior experience."), (that "[t]he petitioner had prior
knowledge of post-conviction relief proceedings."), and (that Petitioner knew there were time

limits for filing a petition for post-conviction relief). Petitioner seeks the opportunity to research
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and respond to the inferences and conclusions as have been drawn by the Court in arguing that
he filed his original post-conviction petition within a "reasonable time", as the Court's
inferences, analysis and conclusions were not contained in the Court's Nottce of Intent to

Dismiss.
e.

The Court states, ''Further, the conduct of appellate counsel on post-conviction

appeals is not grounds for relief" Memorandum Decision at 14. The Court also sets forth an
apparent argument that Petitioner could not prove prejudice in his claims against his appellate
counsel in stating, "Further, even if appellate counsel had properly raised on appeal the extension
of Pizutto, for purposes of the petition for review, it is pure speculation that the Idaho Supreme
Court would have extended the reasoning in Pizutto to noncapital cases." Id. Petitioner seeks
the opportunity to research and respond to these legal analysis and conclusions, which were not
contained in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
f.

The Court finally concludes that the doctrines of ''law of the case" and res

judicata bar Petitioner's claim. Given the full legal analysis of the Memorandum Decision,
Petitioner seeks the opportunity to respond to the Court's conclusion. Petitioner acknowledges
that the Court gave notice of the intent to dismiss based upon these two legal decisions in the
Court· s Notice ofIntent to Dismiss; however, Petitioner asserts that the legal basis and reasoning
for concluding the same as set forth in the Memorandum Decision is now substantially different.
Therefore, Petitioner seeks the opportunity to research and respond to the Court's conclusion.
Petitioner has not had the opportunity to respond or in any way answer any of the
foregoing factual assertions, analysis or legal conclusions of the Court. Pursuant to Idaho Code
§ l 9-4906(b), Petitioner simply asks that he be given twenty (20) days to have the ability to

research and answer the same and thereby have "a chance to argue the point(s) which determine
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the outcome of (Petitioner's] case" and "have the opportunity to challenge an adverse decision
before it becomes final". Gibbs. at 760, 653 P.2d at 815 (Ct App. 1982).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Petitioner requests that the Court, pursuant to Idaho Code §
19-4906 grants Petitioner a period of twenty (20) days to respond to the Court's new factual
assertions, analysis and legal conclusions as contained in the Memorandum Decision re: Notice
ofIntent to Dismiss. Oral Argument is requested on this matter.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2013.

McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By:~
Steven R. McRae
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of August, 2013, I served a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing document upon the following:
Gooding County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 86
Gooding. ID 83330
Fax: (208) 934-4494

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[x ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING

ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)

)

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Respondent.

______________

Case No. CV-2013-84

)
)
)
)
)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On July 31, 2013 the Court entered its Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of Intent to
Dismiss and Judgment of Dismissal as to the petitioner's Second Successive Petition for PostConviction Relief.
On August 14, 2013 counsel for the petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner seeks reconsideration based on Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 653 P.2d 813 (Ct. App.
1982). The court gave notice to the petitioner in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss that the
issue of timeliness of the claims asserted in his first successive petition were finally determined
by the Idaho Court of Appeals and that it was the burden of the petitioner to provide a "sufficient
reason" to support a second successive petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was put
on notice that it was his burden to present those facts that he allegedly provided to his previously
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appointed post-conviction that would have established the timeliness of his first successive
petition.
The court provided sufficient notice to the petitioner that he had the burden to establish a
sufficient reason to support his second successive petition for post-conviction relief. The can be
no dispute that the court's grounds upon which summary disposition is based must be stated.
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009); LC.§ 194906(b). In DeRushe, the Court retreated from a series of cases that required a high level of
detail and specificity regarding the asserted deficiencies in the petitioner's claims in order to be
considered adequate notice. The Court stated that "The particularity requirement of Rule 7(b)(l)
does not mandate that level of detail. The Rule only requires reasonable particularity. If the
notice is sufficient that the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice, the requirement is
met." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (internal citations
omitted). In Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010), the Court held that the State's
motion for summary disposition stating simply that Kelly "has no evidentiary basis to support his
claims, Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998)" was adequate
notice to place the question of the sufficiency of Kelly's evidentiary support for all of his claims
at issue. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522, 236 P .3d 1277, 1282 (2010).
The petitioner alleged that the determination that his first successive petition was
untimely was for the reason that his prior post-conviction counsel had failed to provide to the
court "facts" on the issue of timeliness of his successive petition. Petitioner claimed to have
disclosed such "facts" to his prior post-conviction counsel and that such counsel failed to use
such facts to support the timeliness of his successive petition. The petitioner presented to the
court the alleged facts, and this court concluded that such "facts" were nothing more than-bare
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conclusions or general allegations. In the absence of a "sufficient reason" for the second
petition for post-conviction relief, the petition is barred by reason of res judicata
and/or the doctrine of the law of the case. The legal conclusions of the court are not the relevant
consideration of the sufficiency of the notice for purposes of summary dismissal. The petitioner
had sufficient notice of the grounds upon which his second successive petition was dismissed.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

~J--l

day of __~ ~ - -

John K. Butler(
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

undersigned, hereby certify that on the ~__;2 day of ~ , 2013 a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTI0N0RRECONSIDERATION was
mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the following persons:
Robert Terry Johnson
IDOC # 27073
ICC- I 219 B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83 707

Gooding County Prosecutor
P.O. Box 86
Gooding, Idaho 83330

Steven R. McRae
McRae Law Office, PLLC
161 5th Ave. South, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303

Deputy Clerk
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208-736-0041

Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
P.O, Box 1233
Twin Falls. ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcRae@MagicValleyLegal.com
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Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING
ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
,)

Case No. CV-2013-84

NOTICE OF APPEAL

_____________
Respondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT. STATE OF IDAHO. AND ITS

ATTORNEY OF RECORD, JOHN HORGAN, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.
The above-named appellant, Robert Johnson, appeals against the above-named
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of Intent to
Dismiss entered July 31, 2013, the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration entered on
August 27. 2013. and the Judgment of Dismissal entered on July 31~ 2013, Honorable John K.
Butler presiding.

2.

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Orders

described in Paragraph l above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (a)(l) and
(7).

Notice of Appeal
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3.
Preliminary Statement of the Issue on Ap_geal. That the issues on appeal will
include all issues as contained and addressed in the Memorandum Decision Re: Notice of Intent
to Dismiss, the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, and other issues to be determined at
a later date.
4.
The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's
record, in addition to those autornatically included under I.A.R 28:
a.

Petition and Affidavit for 2nd Successive Post Conviction Relief filed on
February 14, 2013;

b.

Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed on March 12, 2013;

c.

Petitioner' s Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed July 3, 2013;

d.

Partial Supplemental Affidavit of Robert Johnson filed July 3, 2013;

e.

Affidavit of Robert Richard Jones filed July 3, 2013;

f.

Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen filed July 3, 2013;

g.

Memorandum Decision Re: Notice oflntent to Dismiss entered July 31,
2013;

h.

Judgment of Dismissal filed July 31, 2013;

i.

Motion for Reconsideration and Request for Opportunity to Respond
I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2), I.C. § 19-4906(b) filed August 14, 2013;

j.

Order Denyuig Motion for Reconsideration entered on August 27, 2013;
and

k.

5.

The Register of Actions in this matter.

I certify:

(a)
That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the Clerk's record because he is incarcerated and is indigent;
(b)
That the Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because
he is incarcerated and is indigent;

(c)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20 I.A.R. and the Attorney General ofldaho.
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DATED THIS "l~ay of )~\)...v' • 2013.

~

Steven R. McRa.e
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATEt 0.1. ,SER~ .
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~day of ~~@OJ\, • 2013. I served a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document up~the attomey(s) or petson{s)
named below in the manner noted:
[g]

U.S. Mail

Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720

[BJ

U.S. Mail

Attorney General's Office

!XI

U.S. Mail

I.ID

U.S. Mail

tm

Facsimile

Gooding County Prosecutor
P.O. Box86

Gooding, ID 83330
Fax: (208) 934-4494

P .0. Box 83720, Room 210
Boise, Idaho 83 720
Office of the State Appellate

Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Gooding County Courthouse
P.O. Box417
Gooding, ID 83330
Fax: (208) 934-4408
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EXHIBIT LIST
Johnson v State
Gooding County Case #CV 2013-000084
Supreme Court Case #41414-2013

(No Exhibits offered or admitted)

EXHIBIT LIST

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING

ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No.

t/1 tfIV

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
Respondent.

___________ ))
I, Cynthia R. Eagle-Ervin, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth
Judicial District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Gooding, do hereby
certify that the above and foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled
and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings
and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
I, do further certify that there were no exhibits offered or admitted and
no hearings held in this matter so there are no Court Reporter's Transcripts to be
lodged with the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
said Court this 28 day of October, 2013.

Clerk of the District Court

By:,ft:f-k
Cynthia1R. 6t{gle-Ervin
Deputy 'trerk ·
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING

***************
ROBERT JOHNSON,
Petitioner/Appellant,

)
)
)

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)

)

Supreme Court No. 41414-2013
CERRIFIACTE OF SERVICEL

I, Cynthia Eagle-Ervin, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Gooding, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record
and any exhibits offered or admitted to each of the Attorneys of Record in this case as
follows:
Sara Thomas
State Appellate Public Defender
P.O. Box 83720
BOISE, ID 83720

Lawrence Wasden
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATEHOUSE MAIL, RM 210
BOISE, IDAHO 83720

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court this 1st day of November, 2013.

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT··
By:~~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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